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By Zachary T. Knepper

In recent years, many companies in the United States have issued so-called
“Future-Priced Convertible Securities.” These companies tend to be small, thinly-traded,
and (most importantly) desperate for cash, and look to the Future-Priced Convertible
Security as a necessary means of financing to keep their businesses operating. FuturePriced Convertible Securities are thus credited by some with providing an important form
of financing in the marketplace.1 Yet these securities are also a source of controversy.
Many companies have wound up regretting issuing these instruments, after watching their
stock values tumble and their market capitalizations dry-up subsequent to issuing these
securities. Issuers have even started to sue.
Many issuers of Future-Priced Convertible Securities are now suing the very
purchasers of these securities alleging, among other things, that the purchasers have
violated antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws such as Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 These cases often allege similar ways by which the
purchasers of the Future-Priced Convertible Securities allegedly harmed the issuers,
giving rise to a unique appellation for these lawsuits: “death spiral” litigation.3 These
cases are called “death spirals” because the investors of the Future Priced Convertible
Securities are alleged to have used the securities in manipulative short-selling schemes
that extract the market value of the issuing companies, thereby enriching the purchasers at
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See generally Beloreshki et al., The Frontiers of Convertible Financing: An Economic and Legal
Perspective on Litigating Future Priced Securities, NERA Working Paper, July 30, 2003, available at
http://www.nera.com/_template.cfm?c=6167&o=6066.
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15 U.S.C. 78j (2004).
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Beloreshki et al., supra note 1, at 19. This issue has also received some coverage in the media, including
a recent article in The Economist magazine. See Toxic Finance, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2003, at 66.
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the expense of issuers and other shareholders. These “death spirals” can result in the
issuer’s being de-listed from an exchange or even forced into bankruptcy.
This paper will analyze six specific death spiral lawsuits with the intention of
evaluating the plaintiffs’ securities fraud claims. In so doing, this paper hopes to provide
insight into the potential success of other lawsuits in an anticipated “wave of litigation”
over Future-Priced Convertible Securities.4 Part I of this paper provides background
information on these securities: what they are, who issues them, who buys them, and why.
Part II then discusses an important legal issue relating to death spirals, the practice and
the law of short selling. Short selling is at the heart of recent litigation over these
securities, and a firm understanding of short selling is necessary for this study. Next, Part
III reviews six specific death spiral cases, analyzing the facts and claims alleged in these
lawsuits and providing some basic conclusions of law. The Analysis section, Part IV,
then examines the legal merits of these death spiral securities fraud complaints in detail.5
Using the six lawsuits discussed in Part III as case studies, the Analysis section
demonstrates that death spiral litigation securities claims are potentially meritorious.
Moreover, this paper will argue at some length that naked short selling should be declared
to be market manipulation if (more likely, when) this issue arises in a death spiral action.
Finally, Part V reviews some of the regulatory concerns affecting Future Priced Securities
and will discuss the significance of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s recently
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E.g., Toxic Finance, supra note 3, at 66. See also Brandon Copple, Sinking Funds, FORBES, June 10,
2002, at 46.
5
The reader is reminded at the outset that death spiral lawsuits allege many different claims, including
securities fraud and other violations of federal securities laws, civil violations of the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, violations of state securities laws, and common law tort, breach
of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Yet the purpose of this paper is to focus narrowly on just
the federal securities fraud claims. Thus, all the other claims raised in death spiral lawsuits aside from
issues of federal securities fraud are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be examined.
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proposed Regulation SHO. This paper concludes that death spiral lawsuits have merit,
though there are complicated legal issues that must be evaluated on the way to a
plaintiff’s recovery.

Part I – Background
A) What Are Future-Priced (“Death Spiral”) Convertible Securities?
Future-Priced Convertible Securities are a recent financial creation issued by
many small companies in the United States. These securities have a variety of names,
including “Future Priced Securities,”6 “Floating-Priced Convertibles,”7 “Private
Investments in Public Equities” (variously, “Structured PIPEs,” or “Toxic PIPEs”),8
“Resetting Convertibles,9 “Floorless Convertibles,”10 and, ignominiously, “Toxic” or
“Death Spiral Convertibles.”11 But all these names refer to essentially the same types of
security. (This paper will refer to these instruments as Future-Priced Convertible
Securities and Future-Priced Securities interchangeably, or simply “FPS’s” for short.)
Future Priced Securities are a form of last-resort financing for companies that
cannot raise money through more traditional debt or equity offerings or through bank
borrowing.12 Firms that issue FPS’s tend to have no alternative.13 The following SEC
Release provides a general introduction to these securities.
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See, e.g., Beloreshki et al., supra note 1, at 1.
See, e.g., Pierre Hillon & Theo Vermaelen, Death Spiral Convertibles, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 2), available at http://jfe.rochester.edu/03026.pdf.
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See, e.g., Leib M. Lerner, Disclosing Toxic PIPES: Why the SEC Can and Should Expand the Reporting
Requirements Surrounding Private Investments in Public Equities, 58 BUS. LAW. 655 (2003).
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See, e.g., Cynthia Webb, Help Comes With a High Price, WASH. POST, April 16, 2001, at E1.
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See, e.g., Toxic Finance, supra note 3, at 66.
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See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Commission Press Release 2003-36, SEC Settles with Rhino Advisors,
Thomas Badian, Feb. 27, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-26.htm.
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See, e.g., Lee R. Petillon & Robert Joe Hull, REPRESENTING START-UP COMPANIES, § 10:16 (2003).
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See infra Part I.B.
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Future Priced Securities are private financing instruments which were
created as an alternative means of quickly raising capital for issuers. The
security is generally structured in the form of a convertible security and is
often issued via a private placement. ... The conversion price of the
Future Priced Security is generally linked to a percentage discount to the
market price of the underlying common stock at the time of conversion
and accordingly the conversion rate for Future Priced Securities floats with
the market price of the common stock. As such, the lower the price of the
issuer’s common stock at the time of conversion, the more shares into
which the Future Priced Security is convertible.14
The distinguishing characteristic of FPS’s is this convertibility into a fixed value
of the issuer’s common stock. This is, of course, different from traditional convertible
securities (whether bonds or preferred stock) that are convertible into fixed numbers of
shares. For example, a Future Priced Security could be convertible into $10 million of
common stock at a future date, thereby giving the holder one million shares at conversion
if the stock’s price is $10/share or 10 million shares if the security is trading at $1/share.15
This convertibility into a fixed value of equity with an indeterminate number of shares is
the distinguishing characteristic of Future Priced Securities.
Aside from this common feature, Future Priced Securities can contain a variety of
rights and obligations for issuers and purchasers because FPS’s are ultimately creatures of
contract. A recent report by Pierre Hillon and Theo Vermaelen, two professors at the
French academy INSEAD, studied 467 Future Priced Securities offerings between 1994
and 1998 and identified a number of common themes among these offerings.16 This
paper adopts some of the common themes identified by these authors into a “classic case”
or “standard case” Future-Priced Convertible Security, which this paper will repeatedly
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Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities and Exchange Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 3441337 (April 27, 1999), available at 1999 SEC Lexis 862, at 2 (emphasis added).
15
See id. at 3.
16
Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 4.
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refer to as a benchmark for studying these instruments. Specifically, “classic case” FPS’s
are defined hereinafter to have the following characteristics.17
First, and most importantly, the classic case FPS will be convertible into a fixed
value of the issuer’s common stock. This is of course the hallmark of a Future Priced
Security.18 Second, FPS’s generally do not pay interest (for bond FPS’s) or dividends
(for preferred stock FPS’s) in cash. Instead, they pay “in kind” through a conversion
discount—that is, the investor is able to convert the security into a greater value of shares
than the face amount invested.19 This paper will assume an average conversion discount
of 15% for the classic case FPS, based on the Hillon/Vermaelen study.20 Third, the
classic case FPS will contain restrictions on the number of shares into which the security
is convertible.21 This cap will be bounded at a minimum by the number of shares
authorized by the company’s articles of incorporation but not yet issued and
outstanding.22
Fourth, FPS contracts usually limit the time periods during which conversion may
occur. 23 The contracts create conversion “windows” that smooth the conversions over
time to prevent a spike in the average trading volumeof th e company’s common stock.
Fifth, and most importantly, most FPS contracts do not prevent purchasers from short
17

The Hillon & Vermaelen report identified six common characteristics of FPS’s: lock-up periods,
conversion discounts, look-back ratios, caps and floors, warrants, and short selling restrictions. See id. at
30-33. Many of these are not relevant for purposes of this paper, however, as they relate to the economics
of FPS’s, not their legal characteristics.
18
See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
19
See Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 3.
20
The Hillon & Vermaelen study found that the average conversion discount in 467 FPS’s was 15.5%. See
id. at 30. Thus, a 15% conversion discount would provide a return of 15% if conversion took place exactly
one year after the security was issued.
21
See id. at 32.
22
The reason for this is that the company cannot issue more shares than authorized in its articles of
incorporation.
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selling. For instance, the Hillon/Vermaelen study of 467 FPS’s found restrictions on
short selling in only 58 of the offerings.24 Similarly, out of the six death spiral cases
examined in Part III and IV of this paper, only two issuers prevented short selling by the
FPS purchasers (while a third attempted to limit it).25 Thus, our classic case FPS will
contain no short selling restrictions.
B) Who Issues Future-Priced Convertible Securities and Why?
Future Priced Securities are a form of last-resort financing for companies that
have nowhere else to turn in the marketplace (a finance professor at Columbia University
has called them “desperation financing”).26 The issuers of these securities tend to be
small, young, and risky technology firms—i.e., firms that have nowhere else to turn.27
For example, the Hillon/Vermaelen study found that 50% of the 261 companies in the
study were either technology or medical service providers and that the average market
capitalization of the 467 firms was $67.5 million.28 It is unclear exactly how many firms
have ever issued an FPS, but the number of offerings has evidently dropped-off in recent
years from a high of (by one count) 395 offerings worth $3.2 billion in 2000.29
Companies such as eToys, DrKoop.com, eFax, and At Home are perhaps among the more
recognizable names of FPS issuers.30
Issuing an FPS is generally done as a last-resort because, as will be examined in
Part III and IV of this paper, FPS’s leave the issuer open to abuse. The Hillon/
23

See Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 30.
Id. at 32-33.
25
See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
26
See Janice Revell, A Most Sinister Form of Financing, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 160.
27
See Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 4.
28
Id. at 17.
29
See Matthew McClearn, The Mysterious World of Death-Spiral Finance, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 15, 2002,
at B1.
24
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Vermaelen report provides empirical evidence for this: 85% of the firms studied saw
declines in their stock prices within the first year of issuing an FPS, and these declines
averaged 34%.31 Yet companies may feel that they have no choice but to issue an FPS if
the alternative is closing the firm. (This perhaps explains why some companies have
issued multiple FPS’s, even after suffering stock losses as a result of prior deals.)32 But
the heyday of the Future Priced Security appears to be over. As one market participant
has noted, this is “a business that doesn’t exist any more, because everybody got tired of
losing money. … Public companies themselves have eliminated this from the market.
They just won’t do these types of deals any more, with anybody.”33
C) Who Buys Future Priced Securities?
Private investment groups such as hedge funds or venture capital firms are the
main purchasers of Future Priced Securities. Issuers of FPS’s sell them to private
purchasers because this avoids the onerous requirements of a registered securities offering
and allows the issuer to achieve its financing objectives quickly and efficiently.34 Most
FPS’s thus qualify under one of the many exemptions from registration within the
Securities Act of 1933. There are a number of funds that appear to specialize in FPS
offerings, including Thomson Kernaghan, Promethean Investment Group, HFTP
Investment LLC, Fisher Capital Ltd., Wingate Capital Ltd., and Southridge Capital

30

See Cory Johnson, Wall Street’s Toxic Tool, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, March 19, 2001.
See Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 4.
32
For example, Nanopierce Technologies, discussed in Part III.A infra, issued an FPS to detrimental effect,
but then went ahead and issued another FPS one year later. See Nanopierce Tech., Inc. v. Promethean
Asset Mgmt, LLC, No. 00-CV-6218, 2002 WL 31819207, at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2001). Similarly,
Hillon/Vermaelen report that twenty companies out of 261 in their study issued at least four FPS’s. See
Hillon & Vermaelen,supra note 7, at 17.
33
McClearn, supra note 29, at B1.
34
See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 8, at 662-64.
31
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Management LLC.35 One investor that has appeared in news articles regarding FPS’s is
Mark Valentine, a former chairman of the firm Thomson Kernaghan.36 Valentine
apparently participated in approximately 150 FPS offerings prior to being subject to
criminal proceedings by United States and Canadian authorities (and being a defendant in
multiple private lawsuits).37
D) “Death Spiral” Litigation – Who Is Suing Whom?
It is often the case in securities fraud litigation that purchasers of a security will
sue the issuers or underwriters, alleging fraud in the security’s offer or sale. But Future
Priced Securities litigation—“death spiral” litigation—turns this on its head. In death
spiral lawsuits, the issuers of FPS’s are suing the purchasers (as well as, in come cases,
brokers and market makers).38 Part III and Part IV of this paper examine death spiral
litigation in detail, but a few themes may be gleaned at the outset.
Issuers of Future-Priced Convertible Securities are suing the purchasers of these
securities, alleging that the purchasers lied to the issuers and manipulated the price of the
issuers’ common stock through short selling. Purchasers allegedly reaped large shortterm profits, at the expense of the company and other shareholders. The basic scheme
underlying these “death spiral” claims is quite simple.

35

See Short Sales: Death Spiral Stock Cost Placement Firm $1.2 Million, Suit Alleges, 9 No. 10 ANDREWS
DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 3 (April 21, 2003); McClearn, supra note 29, at B1. In the author’s research, he
has come across these names a number of times, often in the context of litigation over FPS’s.
36
See McClearn, supra note 29, at B1.
37
See id. at B1 (stating that Valentine has been arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and indicted
for wire, mail and securities fraud and suspended by Canadian securities authorities).
38
For instance, JAG Media Holdings, discussed in Part III.A, is suing 152 named defendants, including the
purchasers of its Future Priced Security, brokers, and other parties. See JAG Media Holdings, Inc. v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc. et al., No. 02-CV-2867 (S.D. Tex.), Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and Jury
Demand, filed Nov. 22, 2002.
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The key to a death spiral scheme is that the FPS purchaser is entitled to a
predetermined value of the issuer’s common stock through the Future Priced Security.
Thus, if the issuer’s stock decreases in price, the FPS purchaser is entitled to that many
more shares upon conversion. Issuers allege that purchasers have used this to their
advantage by, for instance, engaging in massive short selling of the issuers stock to
intentionally depress the stock’s price. Then, after a few weeks or months when the
issuer’s stock has fallen (sometimes to nothing), the purchasers convert their FPS’s into
huge numbers of shares, covering their short positions. Indeed, because of the way FPS’s
operate, purchasers have an incentive to short sell: the lower the stock’s price, the more
shares the FPS purchaser can achieve at conversion and, since the return is fixed, the
more shares that can be used to cover short-selling positions.
Moreover, FPS purchasers are able to effectuate these “death spirals” because the
issuers are small, thinly traded over-the-counter companies thatlikely have too few
buyers to sustain the prices of their securities in the face of the FPS purchasers’ huge
short selling positions. Thus, prices inevitably fall. Part II will also explain how the
absence of pricing rules in many of the over-the-counter securities markets means that
there are no regulatory barriers to the FPS purchasers’ abusive activities. Issuers thus
allege that the FPS purchasers reap huge short-term profits by essentially draining the
issuer’s market capitalization and leaving the issuer and innocent investors with a vastly
deflated stock price, making de-listing of the issuer—or even bankruptcy—likely. This
set of facts underlying “death spirals” has apparently been repeated many times,39 and has
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See, e.g., McClearn, supra note 29.
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received the attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission.40 This paper will now
turn to an examination of short selling, the context through which death spirals are
alleged to occur.

Part II – The Practice & The Law of Short-Selling
A) The Practice of Short Selling
The basic principles underlying short selling are fairly simple.41 A short sale is
the sale of a security that the seller does not yet own (or owns but chooses not to
deliver).42 The short seller instead borrows the security from another market participant,
delivering the borrowed security to the short-sale purchaser and thereby completing the
short. The short seller will then be obligated to return the securities to the lender—i.e., to
“cover” the short—by repurchasing equivalent securities in the marketplace at some later
date and delivering these securities to the lender. Covering completes the short sale
process: the lender and purchaser each will own the security, while the short seller
(hopefully) will earn a profit. The short seller will earn a profit on the short sale if the
stock’s price falls between the time of the short sale and the time the short seller covers.
This also demonstrates that short selling is very risky: if the stock price rises after the
40

See Securities & Exchange Commission Press Release 2003-26, supra note 11, containing the following
statement from the Associate Director for the Division of Enforcement: “Certain convertible securities,
particularly those referred to as ‘toxic’ or ‘death spiral’ convertibles, present the temptation for persons
holding the convertible securities to engage in manipulative short selling of the issuer’s stock in order to
receive more shares at the time of conversion.” This press release deals with a settled enforcement action
against an FPS investor, Rhino Advisors, and its president, Thomas Badian. This enforcement action
derived from the facts of the Sedona case, which this paper will examine. See infra Part III.A and note 123.
41
For a discussion of short selling practices, see generally Ralph S. Janvey, Short Selling, 20 Sec. Reg. L.J.
270, 271-76 (1992), and IRVING M. POLLACK, SHORT-SALE REGULATION OF NASDAQ SECURITIES 15-18
(July 1986).
42
It is actually possible to short-sell a security that the investor already owns but chooses not to deliver
through a practice known as “selling against the box.” Short sales “against the box” otherwise proceed like
traditional short sales, but the short seller simply holds-on to the securities it already owns. Short sales
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short sale, the short seller will be forced to cover the short sale at a higher price, thereby
covering at a loss. And since there is theoretically no limit to how high a stock can climb,
the short sellers loss could potentially be huge.
Short selling has existed for centuries in securities and commodities markets43 and
is seen to provide at least two market benefits: market liquidity and pricing efficiency.44
First, short selling provides market liquidity (i.e., increased trading opportunities)
because, other things being equal, short selling increases the number of sellers in the
marketplace. This liquidity usually comes from market makers and other market
specialists who use short sales to offset (and potentially profit from) occasional
contractions in the supply of a security.45 Second, short selling provides pricing
efficiency because arbitrageurs can use short sales to equilibrate the price of a security to
its perceived ‘correct’ value. For example, if an arbitrageur determines (for whatever
reason) that the price of a security is too high, the arbitrageur can use short sales as a
means of profiting from the expected decline in the security’s price. This short selling
activity helps the market to price the security ‘correctly.’46 These two perceived short
selling benefits (liquidity and pricing efficiency) are accepted by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.47

against the box are generally used to avoid incurring taxes on the sale of a security that the seller already
owns or to hedge against risks in a stock portfolio. See Janvey, supra note 41, at 271 & nn.5, 6.
43
See POLLACK, supra note 41, at 20, stating that the Dutch and English evidently regulated short selling as
long ago as the 1600’s and 1700’s.
44
Janvey, supra note 41, at 272.
45
Id.
46
For a classic example of short selling in action, see Sullivan & Long Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857
(7th Cir. 1995).
47
See Proposed Rules: Short Sales, Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Regulation SHO,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-48709, 68 F.R. 62972, 62974, Nov. 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL
22507877 [hereinafter SEC Proposed Regulation SHO].

- 11 -

But just as short selling has market benefits, it is also seen as potentially predatory
or abusive. Indeed, concerns about short selling figured prominently in the creation of the
United States securities laws in the 1930’s.48 Some commentators at the time excoriated
short sellers as “bear raiders” and blamed them for preventing a recovery from the stock
market crash of 1929 and for prolonging the effects of the Great Depression.49 Others
argued that short selling was “a necessary feature of an open market for securities”50 and
that it was important to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate short selling.51
“Apparently finding it impossible to discover where the truth lay between the extreme
views that had been expressed, Congress in §10(a) [of the Securities Exchange Act]
simply placed the practice of short selling in registered securities under the plenary
rulemaking authority of the [Securities and Exchange] Commission.”52 Section 10(a) of
the Exchange Act thus gives the SEC the authority to regulate short selling on the
nation’s securities exchanges.53

48

See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 702 & n.60 (3d ed.
1995). See also Jonathan R. Macey et al., 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 799 (1989) (stating that, during the
drafting of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, “Representative Adolph Sabath of Illinois wanted to ban
all short sales in order to ‘eliminate what we term short selling ... the greatest evil that has been permitted or
sanctioned by the Government that I know of.’").
49
See 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3200 & n.214 (3d ed. 1989).
50
See id. at 3200 & n.213.
51
See Comments of Richard Whitney, NYSE President, 1931, reprinted in Short Sales of Securities,
Securities and Exchange Commission Exchange Act Release No. 34-13091 (Dec. 21, 1976), available at
1976 SEC Lexis 90, at 11.
52
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 3201. It is instructive that Congress placed its discussion of
short selling in Section 10 of the Exchange Act, “Regulation and Use of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devices,” and that the subsequent paragraph, Section 10(b), is the Exchange Act’s principle antifraud
provision.
53
See David C. Worley, The Regulation of Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55 BROOK. L.R. 1255,
1275 n.75 (1990) (“it appears that the SEC does not have authority under the Exchange Act section 10(a) to
regulate the short selling of purely OTC stocks since section 10(a) refers to short sales effected in securities
registered on an exchange…”). This limitation remains in the current text of Sec. 10(a). See 15 U.S.C. 78j
(2004).
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As discussed above, the basic principles of short selling are reasonably simple.
Yet the practice becomes very complex in the marketplace due to locating and delivery
issues and margin requirements. Unfortunately, it is necessary to discuss these complex
standards in order to fully appreciate the issues involved with Future Priced Securities
litigation. Thus, it is to the details of short selling that this paper now turns.
The reader will recall that short selling is possible because of securities
borrowing.54 To borrow a security, the short seller must have a margin account (as
opposed to a ‘cash account’) with a securities broker.55 The short seller also must have
deposited into this account sufficient money or securities to maintain minimum margin
levels required for the account.56 These minimum margin levels differ for various market
participants. For instance, individuals must maintain margin levels of 150% of the value
of any short selling activity in their margin accounts, while market makers and selfclearing brokers need only be able to cover their net short-sale positions every day.57

54

See POLLACK, supra note 41, at 15 (“Technically, a short-sale transaction begins with the decision to
borrow securities, since the short seller’s broker should have reason to believe he can borrow the stock
before executing an order.”).
55
See, e.g., Mark Hulbert, Season for Shorting?, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1990, at 231; Ray Brady, Selling Short:
Not for the Faint of Heart, NATION’S BUS., March 1987, at 63.
56
NYSE Rule 431 and NASD Rule 2520 require that a “minimum margin” of $2,000 be deposited into any
customer’s margin account before margin trading (and short selling) may begin, though brokers may require
higher deposits. The NASD recently increased its margin requirement for “day traders” to $25,000. See
“Investing with Borrowed Funds: No ‘Margin’ for Error,” available from the NASD website,
www.nasd.org.
57
See Janvey, supra note 41, at 273 & n.8 (“The Federal Reserve’s Regulation T specifies the amount of
money that brokers can lend to their customers for the purchase of securities ‘on margin,’ and it also
specifies the additional cash ‘margin’ that an investor must deposit or borrow in order to make a short sale.
The present margin requirement on most short sales is 150 percent, meaning the broker must hold the
proceeds of the sale (100 percent), and the investor must deposit or borrow an additional 50 percent. Short
sales by exchange specialists and market makers, and proprietary short sales by self-clearing brokers, are
exempt from this requirement.”). Since market makers and self-clearing brokers will potentially have many
off-setting orders, they are required only to maintain a net position that would allow them to cover all open
short sales each day. See POLLACK, supra note 41, at 16.
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Once the account is established and a short-sell order is made, the short seller’s
broker takes over. It is the broker’s responsibility to execute the short sale by locating
securities to borrow.58 Brokers can accomplish this by borrowing the securities from
other customers’ margin accounts, from other brokers, or from institutions that agree to
lend their securities.59 “Securities lending for this purpose is highly organized, and
usually the seller’s broker has no problem borrowing the necessary shares, either from
other customers’ margin accounts or from another broker.”60 If the securities are
borrowed from another broker or from an institutional lender, the borrowing broker will
be required to transfer 100% of the value of the borrowed securities in cash to the
lender.61 This is the lender’s incentive to lend the securities. “These funds are held in
interest-bearing assets by the stock lender to increase his rate of return on his investment
in the underlying security loaned out, or, in the case of a lending broker, to reduce the
margin funds borrowed from banks.”62 For the securities lender, this provides the use of
‘free money.’63
At this point, shares have been located for borrowing, margin has been posted
with the lender, and the short sale is then executed. This process is transparent in the
marketplace: the purchaser on the other side of the trade will ordinarily have no

58

See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 72 (2003).
See POLLACK, supra note 41, at 16. If the broker borrows securities from another customer’s account,
there is no requirement to notify the customer. The reason for this is that when a customer sets up a margin
account, the customer must agree to allow her securities to be leant by the broker. See Janvey, supra note
41, at 275.
60
Janvey, supra note 41, at 274. Typically, the actual securities will come from the accounts of brokerdealers or institutional investors. See id. at 271-72 & n.5.
61
See POLLACK, supra note 41, at 16.
62
Id.
63
See Stock Strategies: Short Selling, GlobalInvestor.com, available at http:magazine.globalinvestor.com/
static/intro/text/school_24.html.
59
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indication that he is buying securities that are being sold short.64 But the shares will not
actually be borrowed at this time. Instead, the shares will be borrowed only when the
trade settles, which can be up to five business days after execution. If for some reason the
short seller’s broker becomes unable to borrow shares at settlement, no shares will be
delivered to the purchaser and a “fail-to-deliver” will result.65 Fails-to-deliver occur at
market clearing agencies whenever an executed trade fails to settle, and they appear in the
account of the selling broker.66 A fail-to-deliver is still a valid trade, it just means that no
payment will be made by the purchaser (nor received by the short seller) until the seller’s
broker acquires the securities, delivers them to the purchaser, and settles the trade.67 As
will be shown in Part IV, fails-to-deliver are an important issue in death spiral litigation.68
The process of short selling also increases beneficial ownership of a security.
Beneficial ownership is the legal right to own a security and, while a short sale is open—
that is, until it is covered and both the purchaser and the lender receive their shares—
short selling temporarily increases beneficial ownership because both the lender and the
purchaser have a legal right to the same shares. The lender never loses its right to the
shares by lending them yet the purchaser acquires a right to the lender’s shares upon
execution of the short sale. 69 This increased beneficial ownership will occur even if there
is a fail-to-deliver (because fails-to-deliver are still valid trades) and will exist until the
short seller covers the short sale. What is more, short sellers do not need to cover
64

See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 48, at 699.
Janvey, supra note 41, at 274 n.9.
66
See id.
67
See, e.g., Fail to Deliver, NetExchange Client Investment Glossary, available at
http://www.netxclient.com/universal2/invest_glosry_FFh.htm.
68
See infra text accompany notes 288-98.
65
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quickly. (This is an important point for a short seller planning the “death spiral” of a
company.) Short sales may remain open for as long as the lending broker allows, and the
short seller’s only responsibility is to maintain its margin with the lender. (The reader
will recall that lenders have an incentive to keep a short open because this provides them
with the use of the short sellers margin—‘free money.’)70 “A genuine securities short
seller, who borrowed the security she has delivered, may hold her position as long as she
is able to meet her margin calls—indefinitely, if she has the financial wherewithal to
withstand a significant rise in the price of the security.”71
B) The Law of Short Selling
1.

Securities Listed on a National Exchange
As previously indicated, Congress placed its instructions with respect to short

selling in Section 10(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.72 This gives the SEC authority to
create rules governing short sales on national securities exchanges, but by its terms
applies only to the exchanges.73 SEC short-selling rules created under Sec. 10(a) thus
only govern short sales of securities traded on an exchange registered pursuant to Section
12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (such as the New York Stock Exchange or
American Stock Exchange).74

69

See Janvey, supra note 41, at 274. Of course, the short sale never results in more shares being
outstanding, nor does it increase the total number of shares in the company, which can only be done by
amending the company’s articles of incorporation.
70
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
71
Richard D. Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market Manipulation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 30, 45 n.36 (1990).
72
See supra notes 52 and accompanying text.
73
See supra notes 53 and accompanying text
74
The SEC’s short selling rules apply only to securities that are registered on the national exchanges and do
not apply to over-the-counter securities that have exchange-trading privileges. See generally Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 34-22975, 51 F.R. 8801 (March 14, 1986). See also, Janvey, supra note 41, at
278.
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There are three basic SEC short selling rules.75 First, Rule 3b-3 defines the term
“short sale”: “‘short sale’ means any sale of a security which the seller does not own or
any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the
account of, the seller.”76 This definition parallels the working definition and description
of short selling outlined by this paper above.77 The second SEC rule is Rule 10a-1,78
which provides the SEC’s substantive regulation of short sales. First adopted in 1938,
Rule 10a-1 contains the SEC’s “tick test.”79
The tick test is a pricing rule that was designed to prevent short selling from
depressing the market values of securities. The SEC adopted the tick to achieve three
objectives: (1) to allow unrestricted short selling in an advancing market; (2) to prevent
short selling at successively lower prices, thereby limiting the ability of short sellers to
drive-down stock prices; and (3) to prevent short sellers from accelerating a declining
market by exhausting all remaining bids at one price.80 Rule 10a-1 does this by
prohibiting short sales at or below the last market price for the security, unless this price
is above the next preceding market price. This is a complicated standard and is best
understood through an example. Say, for instance, that market sales occur at $49.85 and
then $50. The tick test would then allow for an infinite number of short sales at $50
(because this is above the last market sale price, which was in turn above the next

75

See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 3203. There are also thirteen exceptions to these SEC rules that
allow for short selling activity the SEC deems to be beneficial, but these exceptions are not important to the
analysis in this paper. See generally Janvey, supra note 41, at 278-79.
76
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-3 (2004).
77
See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Cf. Worley, supra note 53, at 1257 (discussing the definition
of “short sale”).
78
17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (2004).
79
See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62978.
80
See Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Rules 10a-1 and 10a-2, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
34-11468, June 12, 1975.
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preceding sale price). But if the two sales were $49.85 and $49.80, the tick test would
prevent any short sales below $49.85 (because the last market sale price was below its
next preceding sale price).”81 The tick test thus necessarily requires real-time monitoring
of pricing data to evaluate acceptable and unacceptable short-sale trades.82
The third SEC short-selling rule is a delivery rule, Rule 10a-2,83 but it is not
germane to the analysis in this paper.84 Instead, a more important delivery rule for
purposes of this paper is the New York Stock Exchange’s delivery rule. NYSE Rule
440C.10 mandates that all brokers executing short sales on the exchange must locate
stock available for borrowing prior to executing the trade.85 This rule therefore should
prevent intentional fails-to-deliver (also known as “naked short selling,” discussed in
detail below).86
2.

Securities Traded in the Over-the-Counter Market
Short selling regulation in the over-the-counter (“OTC”) market is unrelated to

short selling regulation on national securities exchanges. The reason for this is that the
SEC’s Section 10(a) authority does not extend to the OTC markets.87 “Although the

81

See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 3203-04.
The operation of the tick test can become quite complicated. For a more detailed examination of how
Rule 10a-1 operates, see Worley, supra note 53, at 1259-62.
83
17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-2 (2004).
84
Rule 10a-2 prohibits brokers or dealers from, among other things, lending securities to effect a sale that is
marked long under Rule 10a-1. For a discussion of Rule 10a-2, see Worley, supra note 53, at 1264-65.
85
See, e.g., SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62976.
86
For a discussion of naked short selling, see infra Part II.B.3.
87
See supra note 53. The SEC evidently could adopt short selling rules for the OTC markets based on
other powers afforded to it by the securities laws, however it has not done so. See Worley, supra note 53, at
1275 n.75 (“Moreover, it appears that the SEC does not have authority under the Exchange Act section
10(a) to regulate the short selling of purely OTC stocks since section 10(a) refers to short sales effected in
securities registered on an exchange. Nevertheless, the SEC presumably would have such authority under
section 15(c)(1) or (2), 15 U.S.C.A. 78o, which, unlike section 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. 78j, grant[s] to the SEC
the authority to define the terms ‘manipulative,’ ‘deceptive,’ and ‘fraudulent.’ While sections 15(c)(1) and
(2) only apply to transactions effected by broker-dealers, the SEC could prohibit them from effecting
transactions for others in contravention of an OTC short sale rule.”).
82
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Commission has regulated short sales since 1938, that regulation has been limited to short
sales of exchange-listed securities.”88 Thus, none of the aforementioned SEC rules apply
to the following discussion.
There are four distinct markets that make up the over-the-counter stockmarket.
The principle market is the Nasdaq National Market (“NNM”).89 This is the over-thecounter listing for major industrial companies, and is distinct from the Nasdaq SmallCap
Market, which lists smaller companies.90 There are two other OTC markets as well, the
Nasdaq Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (“OTCBB”) and the Pink Sheets.91 Short
selling regulation of these four over-the-counter markets is bifurcated into two basic
regimes: the rules for Nasdaq National Market and the rules for the three other three.

88

See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-48967, 68 F.R. 75299,
Dec. 30, 2003, available at 2003 WL 23021289. The SEC has been reviewing the issue of short-selling
regulations of OTC securities for many years. Since the SEC does not have explicit authority to draft an
OTC short-selling rule under Sec. 10(a) it would have to do so indirectly. In 1974, as part of changes in the
securities markets ordered by Congress, the SEC changed Rule 10a-1 to make it applicable to all securities
listed on the new “Consolidated Tape” in the nascent national market system. This would ostensibly
include OTC securities reported as part of the Consolidated Tape, however the SEC ‘temporarily’ exempted
OTC securities from the short-sale rule until the NASD could confirm that the OTC market was ready for it.
See Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Rules 10a-1 and 10a-2 Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-11468, June 12, 1975, available at 1975 WL 162899. This
never happened. Then, in 1985, the SEC issued additional Releases potentially broadening the scope of
Rule 10a-1 further in covering OTC securities. Again, however, OTC securities escaped SEC regulation.
In March 1986, the SEC adopted a permanent amendment exempting transactions in OTC stocks from the
short sale rule. See Worley, supra note 53, at 1274-75.
89
See, e.g., www.nasdaq.com.
90
The listing standards for the NNM and SmallCap markets are based on a complex of factors, but,
basically, Nasdaq National Market companies will have market capitalizations of over $50 million while
SmallCap companies will have capitalizations below $50 million. See Nasdaq Stock Market, Listing
Requirements and Fees, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_listing_req_fees.pdf. In terms
of the numbers of companies in each market, there are currently about 2,600 NNM stocks and only about
680 SmallCap stocks. See Nasdaq Market Classification, available at http://www.nasdaqnews.com/
MarketData/News_mrktdata_home.htm.
91
There are many thousands of OTCBB and Pink Sheet companies, which are very small, largely
unregulated issuers. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, Heard on the Street: OTC Trading Surges as
Speculation Makes a Comeback, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at C1 (indicating that there are approximately
3,400 OTCBB stocks); Jeff D. Opdyke, More Blue Chips Hit the Pink Sheets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2003,
at D1 (indicating that there are approximately 3,300 Pink Sheet stocks).

- 19 -

a. Short Selling in the Nasdaq National Market92
Since the SEC’s Section 10(a) authority does not extend to the OTC markets,93 it
took rulemaking from the National Association of Securities Dealers to provide short
selling regulation for the Nasdaq National Market. This occurred ten years ago.94 In
1994, the SEC approved NASD Rule 3350, which has much the same function as Rule
10a-1 but which is applicable to the Nasdaq National Market.95 Rule 3350 is similar to
the SEC’s tick test in that it prevents short sales from exerting downward pricing pressure
on a security. It does this by requiring that all short sales in the NNM be at or above the
recent market “inside bid” (i.e., the highest current bid price in the market).96 Rule 3350
is reinforced by another NASD rule, Rule 3370. Rule 3370 is a delivery rule and instructs
that no NASD member shall execute a short sale unless the member makes an
“affirmative determination” that the member will receive the security from the customer
or can borrow the security on behalf of the customer.97 Rule 3370 thus parallels NYSE
Rule 440C.10 in the attempt to prevent intentional fails-to-deliver.98 Finally, NASD Rule

92

The Nasdaq recently applied to the SEC to become a regulated securities “exchange.” See The Nasdaq
Stock Market, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Application for Registration as a National Securities Exchange
Under Section 6 of the Exchange Act, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-44396, June 7, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 629346. If this occurs, then of course the regulation of NNM securities will become
subject to the SEC’s exchange rules just like all exchange-traded securities. See SEC Proposed Regulation
SHO, supra note 47, at 62979.
93
See supra notes 53 and 87.
94
See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities Exchange Act Release no. 34-34277, June 29, 1994,
available at 1994 WL 317379. Rule 3350 was originally issued on a temporary basis, but has been reauthorized multiple times and thus has been continuously operative to the present. See Self-Regulatory
Organization Notice, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-48967 (Dec. 30, 2003).
95
See Self-Regulatory Organization Notice, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-48967 (Dec. 30,
2003).
96
See id.
97
See Rule 3370, available through the NASD Manual Online at: http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd.
98
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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11830 addresses the problem of fails-to-deliver by preventing short sales of securities for
which significant fails-to-deliver have built up at a market clearing agency.99
The regulatory regimes for exchange-traded securities and Nasdaq National
Market securities are thus similar in design. Both employ a price-maintenance rule, and
both have broker delivery requirements. But as will be seen below, the short selling
regime for SmallCap, OTCBB, and Pink Sheets stocks is different in one critical respect:
it lacks a pricing rule such as the tick test or bid test. This is a significant difference, and
impacts death spiral litigation.
b. Short-Selling in the Nasdaq SmallCap Market, Over-the-Counter Bulletin
Board, and Pink Sheets
In contrast to the regulated exchanges and, more recently, the NNM, the SmallCap
Market, Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board and Pink Sheets are not subject to any shortsale pricing rule.100 Rule 10a-1 does not apply because these are OTC markets, NASD
Rule 3350 does not apply because it is limited to the Nasdaq National Market,101 and
there are no substitutes. Thus, the companies in these three OTC markets (which are, of
course, all small issuers) lack the single most important form of short selling regulation, a
pricing rule. Given the SEC’s three rationales for the pricing rules,102 it appears clear that
small companies need and deserve these protections at least as much as larger, more
seasoned issuers. Yet the small OTC markets receive no help from regulators. These
three markets are subject to other NASD rules such as the delivery requirements listed
99

See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62977. NASD Rule 11830 restricts short sales
where over 10,000 fails to deliver have accumulated and this is at least 1/2% of the issuer’s total shares
outstanding.
100
See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 3215; SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at
62972.
101
See NASD Rule 3350, available at http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd.
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above,103 however this provides only incidental short selling regulation and is far less
protective of price manipulation than Rule 10a-1 or Rule 3350.
3.

Naked Short Selling
A final short selling issue that appears in the context of death-spiral litigation is

the topic of “naked short selling.” Naked short selling is the practice of short-selling a
security without borrowing the shares necessary to make delivery to the purchaser. A
naked short will thus result in a fail-to-deliver securities to the purchaser.104 Although
intentional naked short selling implicitly violates a selling broker’s locate-and-delivery
obligations under rules such as NYSE Rule 440C.10 and NASD Rule 3370 (see above),
naked short selling is not per se illegal.105 The reason for this is that securities are not
always available for borrowing, even when a broker reasonably expects them to be, and
thus a certain amount of naked short selling is virtually inevitable.
When brokers arrange a short sale, they do not actually target specific shares held
in a specific account that will be used to settle the short. Instead, brokers execute short
sales in reliance upon lists that identify how easy securities are to borrow.106 Short sale
positions are then netted against each other each day in a complex clearing system.107 It
is thus entirely possible that a broker may perform her duty and reasonably believe that
she has located securities for the short sale, only to find that, on the settlement date, no

102

See supra text accompanying note 80.
See NASD Rule 3370, 11380, available at http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd.
104
See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62974 (“Naked short selling is selling short
without borrowing the necessary securities to make delivery, thus potentially resulting in a ‘fail to deliver’
securities to the buyer.”). This paper has previously discussed fails-to-deliver, see supra text accompanying
notes 64-67.
105
See Worley, supra note 53, at 1282 (“Naked short selling by NASD-member broker-dealers that are
registered with the SEC is not in and of itself illegal.”).
106
See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62976.
107
See Worley, supra note 53, at 1278.
103

- 22 -

securities are available for delivery. If this occurs, the seller and purchaser on either side
of the as-yet-uncompleted short sale then may desire to keep the short sale open rather
than cancel the short or clear it through other means.108 And there is ordinarily no limit
on how long the short may remain unsettled.109 Thus, naked shorts may linger and
accumulate at the securities clearing agencies.110
It is unclear when, if at all, naked short selling is unlawful,111 and this paper can
find no court case that definitively addresses this point.112 The SEC’s position is also
unclear. In 2003, the SEC reaffirmed a prior Exchange Act Release on naked short
selling from 1962,113 but the exact contours of the Commission’s views are muddy. For
instance, the recent SEC Release states: “The Commission issued a prior statement
cautioning broker-dealers that where the broker-dealer has sold short, but did not, for a
substantial period of time, effect the offsetting purchase transactions for purpose of
delivery, this could generally involve violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Federal

108

For instance, the seller may not want to settle the trade by borrowing from a different lender (assuming
securities can be located) as this may have to be done at higher cost. Nor would the seller choose to settle
the short by purchasing securities in the open market, as this would cancel-out the short position. Similarly,
the purchaser (who is awaiting delivery on the short sale) may not want to cancel the lawful trade nor
demand delivery, because a demand would force the purchaser to conduct a buy-in, which has costs for the
purchaser. See Worley, supra note 53, at 1279.
109
See Worley, supra note 53, at 1278 (“Unless the purchaser or its clearing broker-dealer demands
delivery of the stock, it may be carried as a fail-to-deliver until the seller decides to purchase or borrow the
stock for delivery to complete the short.”).
110
SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62975.
111
Compare 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.22 (4th ed. 2004) (“Uncovered,
or ‘naked,’ short sales are manipulative and hence in violation of the 1934 Act.), with Worley, supra note
53, at 1282 (“Naked short selling by NASD-member broker-dealers that are registered with the SEC is not
in and of itself illegal.).
112
See generally Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1995) (implying that a
market maker’s intentional naked short selling that did not violate exchange rules is not unlawful); In re
Olympia Brewing Co. Lit., 613 F. Supp. 1286, 1295 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (dismissing naked short selling
allegation for want of evidence without evaluating the underlying legal issue).
113
See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62975 n.29.
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securities laws.”114 This shows that the SEC considers naked short selling to be
potentially fraudulent, but provides no useful guidance as to the boundaries of the
illegality. For example, it does not instruct what level of scienter is required and whether
persons other than brokers can engage in fraudulent naked short selling. The one-page
1962 Release is similarly unhelpful.115

Part III – Review Of Six FPS Actions:
Facts and Claims Alleged & A Few Court Decisions
This paper will now review six Future Priced Securities cases to begin the analysis
of death spiral litigation. Five of these cases are from the Southern District of New York
and are discussed in subparagraph “A” below.116 The sixth case, GFL v. Colkitt, is a case
out of Pennsylvania and will be examined separately in subparagraph “B.” GFL reached
a final judgment before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and, as
will be demonstrated, has important precedential value for other FPS litigation.117
The purpose of this review is to identify the common facts and claims alleged in
these cases as well as the legal conclusions that may be drawn from them. As indicated at
the outset of this paper, these cases raise a variety of claims, including federal and state
securities violations, civil violations of the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), and common law tort, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty

114

See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62975 n.29, citing Short Sales of Securities,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-6778, April 16, 1962.
115
See Short Sales of Securities, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-6778, April 16, 1962, available
at 1962 WL 69297.
116
See infra notes 120-24.
117
See infra Part III.B.
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claims.118 Yet this paper reviews only the federal securities fraud claims filed under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
A) Five Future-Priced Securities Cases from the Southern District of New York
To investigate the topic of Future Priced Securities litigation, this paper examines
five specific complaints that have been filed in the Southern District of New York in
recent years. This paper reviews these complaints like a court evaluating a motion to
dismiss—i.e., this paper assumes as true all allegations in the complaints and considers
publicly available information, such as the securities filings from these companies
available from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database system.119
1. The Issuers and Their Future Priced Securities
The following table identifies these five cases, by plaintiff and defendant. In each
case, of course, the plaintiffs were issuers of Future Priced Securities suing the purchasers
of their securities. The table also identifies the markets in which the issuers’ securities
were traded, which, as indicated above, determines the level of short selling regulation
involved.

118
119

See infra Part III.A.2.
The SEC’s EDGAR database may be accessed at: www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html.
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Plaintiff (FPF Issuer)
Internet Law Library, Inc.
Log On America, Inc.
Nanopierce Technologies, Inc.
Sedona, Corp.
JAG Media Holdings, Inc.

Defendant (FPS Purchaser)
Southridge Capital Mgmt., et al.
Promethean Asset Mgmt., et al.
Southridge Capital Mgmt., et al.
Ladenburg Thalmann, et. al.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., et al.

Market
OTCBB120
NNM121
OTCBB122
SmallCap123
OTCBB124

This table shows that four of the five companies traded in the less regulated over-thecounter markets, so their securities were not protected by the SEC’s or NASD’s short sale
pricing rules.125 Furthermore, because these issuers were small companies, it is
reasonable to conclude that their stocks were thinly traded—i.e., the companies had low
average daily trading volume—and that the companies were not widely followed by
securities analysts.126

120

See Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt. LLC, et al., No. 01-CV-06600 (S.D.N.Y.),
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint and Request for Injunction, filed July 20, 2001, ¶ 12 [hereinafter Internet
Law Library Complaint].
121
I.e., Log On America traded in the Nasdaq National Market. See Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean
Asset Mgmt. LLC, et al., No. 00-CV-6218 (S.D.N.Y.), Complaint and Jury Demand, filed Aug. 18, 2000, ¶
1. (Note: there was a subsequent Amended Complaint filed in the Log On America action, however the
author was unable to obtain it from the Southern District of New York Clerk of the Court’s office.)
122
See Nanopierce Tech. Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt. LLC, et al., No. 02-CV-0767 (S.D.N.Y.), First
Amended Complaint, filed June 24, 2002, ¶ 1 [hereinafter Nanopierce Complaint].
123
I.e., Sedona traded in the Nasdaq SmallCap market prior to issuing its Future Priced Security. See
Sedona Corp. v. Ladenburg Thalmann, et al., No. 03-CV-3120 (S.D.N.Y.), First Amended Complaint and
Jury Demand, filed July 18, 2003, ¶ 102 [hereinafter Sedona Complaint].
124
See JAG Media Holdings, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. et al., No. 02-CV-2867 (S.D. Tex.),
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, filed Nov. 22, 2002 [hereinafter JAG Media
Holdings Complaint]. See JagNotes.com Securities Purchase Agreement, dated June 12, 2000, Sec. 3(e),
available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089029/000088981200002829/0000889812-00002829-0003.txt.
125
See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
126
These facts are relevant for the Analysis section. Specifically, the complaints indicate that Internet Law
Library’s market capitalization prior to its FPS offering was approximately $200 million (see Internet Law
Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 23), Log On America’s was approximately $140 million (see Log On
America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 2), and Sedona’s was approximately $280 million (see Sedona
Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 66). The Nanopierce and JAG Media Holdings complaints do not provide
such information. Also, based on a review of financial websites, none of these five companies is currently
being followed by a securities analyst, though the author was unable to determine whether these companies
were followed by analysts when they issued their Future Priced Securities. However, this appears unlikely
based on their small market capitalization, poor finances, and limited market power.
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There are other common themes among these companies as well. These issuers
were all small technology companies, desperate for cash when they issued their Future
Priced Securities. Internet Law Library’s business was offering legal research services
over the internet, and it operated at a loss, had negative cash flows, and warned investors
that it might never achieve profitability.127 It therefore sought a $28 million FPS to keep
its business going.128 Log On America was another internet company and was similarly
cash-poor: “We have incurred net losses since our inception and anticipate continuing
losses.”129 By comparison, Nanopierce Technologies’ held a series of patents that it
hoped to commercialize, but it knew these might never become marketable.130 Sedona
sold business software and claimed to have a solid business plan based on, among other
things, a strategic partnership with IBM Corp. Nevertheless, it too operated at a loss131
and agreed to a $50 million FPS to finance planned growth.132 Finally, JAG Media
Holdings (known prior to issuing its FPS as “JagNotes.com”) issued a $10 million FPS to
finance a financial television program related to its internet financial advisory business.133

127

See Internet Law Library Form S-1, filed Dec. 22, 2000, (“We expect net losses and negative cash flows
to continue for the foreseeable future as we continue to incur significant operating expenses and make
capital investments in our business. We may never generate sufficient revenues to achieve profitability.”),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/3959/000093066100003254/0000930661-00-0032540001.txt
128
See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 130.
129
See, e.g., Log On America Form S-3, filed May 23, 2000, Risk Factors, available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1074927/0000889812-00-002465-index.html.
130
See Nanopierce Technologies Form S-3/A, filed May 23, 2000, Prospectus & Risk Factors, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/827161/0000927356-00-001187-index.html.
131
See Sedona 1999 Form 10-K, filed May 30, 2000, Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/764843/0000950116-00-000719-index.html.
132
See Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶¶ 44 & 56.
133
See JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶¶ 160 & 162.
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It may be assumed that the company hoped this investment would mitigate its otherwise
large operating losses.134
In addition to the issuers being small and financially weak, their Future Priced
Securities generally shared the characteristics of this paper’s “classic case” FPS discussed
earlier.135 The following is not an exhaustive analysis, but provides some examples to
demonstrate these points. As a threshold matter, it is important to note that these
companies did not need to seek shareholder approval prior to issuing their Future Priced
Securities. For example, Internet Law Library had 100 million shares authorized under its
articles of incorporation but only 35 million outstanding at the time of its FPS, so its
directors were well within their authority to issue an FPS capped at 30.7 million shares.136
The directors of Sedona had similar authority to issue that company’s future-priced
convertible preferred stock due to a large number of authorized but un-issued shares.137
These five FPS deals parallel this paper’s “classic case” FPS. First, of course,
they provide an opportunity for profit. These companies did not pay dividends or interest
on their FPS’s (since they all have limited—negative—cash flows), but instead
compensated investors with conversion discounts.138 Internet Law Library’s conversion
discount, for instance, was a minimum of 20%. Thus, its investors had a reasonable
134

See JagNotes.com Form 10-QSB, filed March 16, 2000, Condensed Consolidated Statement of Cash
Flows, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089029/0000889812-00-001211-index.html.
135
The reader will recall that this paper’s “classic case” FPS is convertible security, stock or bond, that is
convertible into a fixed amount of the issuer’s stock, at a conversion discount of 15%. Furthermore, the
classic case FPS caps the number of shares the stock can be converted into and contains conversion
windows. Finally, there are no short selling restrictions in the classic case FPS. See supra text
accompanying notes 18-24.
136
See Internet Law Library Form S-1, filed Dec. 22, 2000, Prospectus & Plan of Distribution, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/3959/000093066100003254/0000930661-00-003254-0001.txt.
137
See, e.g., Sedona Form S-3, filed June 26, 2000, Description of Preferred Stock, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/764843/000095011600001517/0000950116-00-001517-0001.txt.
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expectation of at least a 20% return.139 The other companies provided similar benefits,
though the details of their conversion discounts are unclear. (For example, the
Nanopierce and Log On America complaints both state that the purchasers of their FPS’s
were entitled to conversion discounts, however the complaints do not identify how much
each discount would be.)140
The purchasers of the Future Priced Securities also made representations and
warranties, both oral and written, in connection with their FPS purchases. In three of
these offerings the purchasers allegedly made representations about their “investment
intent” with respect to the FPS offerings.141 These representations were made either in
writing via the securities purchase agreement142 or orally during negotiations, or both.143
Furthermore, the purchasers made representations about their abilities and willingness to
finance the FPS deals as well as about their prior business and investment practices.144
(The issuers thus sought to know ‘what sort of investors they were dealing with.’) Most
importantly, though, only two of the five offerings restricted short selling by the FPS
purchasers: Internet Law Library145 and Sedona146 prohibited short selling through their

138

See, e.g., Sedona Form S-3, filed June 26, 2000, Dividend Policy, available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/764843/000095011600001517/0000950116-00-001517-0001.txt.
139
See Internet Law Library Form S-1, supra note 136, at 24. The conversion is variable, but is at least a
20% discount.
140
See Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶ 17; Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 19.
The complaints do not state what the conversion discount was and the author unable to calculate these
himself because of the extreme complexity of the conversion calculations.
141
The three are Log On America, Internet Law Library, and Sedona. See Log On America Complaint,
supra note 121, ¶ 30; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 14; Sedona Complaint, supra note
123, ¶ 54.
142
See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 30.
143
See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 14.
144
See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 56; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120,
¶ 14; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶ 34; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 50.
145
See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 14c; Internet Law Library Securities Purchase
Agreement, filed Dec. 22, 2000, Sec. 5.12 Certain Trading Restrictions, available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/3959/000093066100003254/0000930661-00-003254-0003.txt.
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securities purchase agreements, while the Nanopierce147 and JAG Media Holdings148 FPS
offerings permitted short selling without restriction. The Log On America offering took a
middle route and prevented uncovered (i.e., naked) short selling.149
Finally, these companies share one other unfortunate similarity: their stock prices
fell dramatically in the months after issuing their FPS’s. Internet Law Library’s shares
fell from $7/share to $0.12/share in the ten months after its FPS offering.150 Log On
America’s stock similarly fell from $17/share to $2.50/share in less than six months,151
while Nanopierce’s stock fell by 60% within just three months.152
2. Legal Claims Alleged Against the FPS Purchasers
In these five cases, the FPS issuers alleged many causes of action against the
purchasers. Some of these claims are common to all the complaints, while others are
raised in only case. In aggregate, though, the issuers allege violations of federal and state
securities laws, violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), and violations of common law. But because the purpose of this paper is to
analyze only the federal securities fraud claims, this paper will not examine the RICO,
state securities law, breach of contract, tort, and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Instead,
this paper focuses only on the federal securities fraud claims filed under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder. (Thus, this paper ignores the following Exchange Act claims filed in these
146

See Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 62.
See Nanopierce Purchase Agreement, dated Oct. 20, 2000, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/827161/000092735600001950/0000927356-00-001950-0006.txt
148
See JAG Media Holdings Securities Purchase Agreement, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1089029/000088981200002829/0000889812-00-002829-0003.txt.
149
See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 32 & Exhibit A-Securities Purchase Agreement, ¶ 4n.
150
See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 22.
151
See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 2.
147
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actions: market manipulation in violation of Section 9;153 Section 13 and 16(a) reporting
violations; violations of the Section 16(b) short-swing trading restrictions; and Section
20(a) control-person liability.)154
a. Misrepresentation Claims
The first federal securities fraud claim common to all the complaints is
misrepresentation in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.155 These are fact
dependent allegations and so will not be exhaustively retold here. However, the
following provides a brief overview of some of these allegations.
Internet Law Library alleged fraud based on alleged oral misrepresentations by the
purchasers of its FPS, Southridge Capital et al. Internet Law Library’s claim is thus a
form of fraud-in-the-inducement: the company alleges that, but for the purchasers’ oral
misrepresentations during preliminary negotiations, the company never would have
issued the FPS to these investors. Specifically, the company alleges the following
misrepresentations: (1) that the purchasers intended and would be able to provide $28
million in financing for the FPS; (2) that they would not short sell for one year (later
152

See Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶ 11.
Two complaints raise claims of market manipulation in violation of Sec. 9 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78i. See JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶ 188; Internet Law Library Complaint,
supra note 120, ¶ 28. These claims are clearly not actionable, however, because these companies trade on
the over-the-counter market while Sec. 9 only applies to exchange-traded securities. See LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 48, at 943 (“In contrast to the relatively elaborate structure of § 9 that Congress
erected to deal with manipulation of the market for securities registered on exchanges, the only statutory
bases for dealing with the manipulation of unregistered securities are the general antifraud provisions of the
1934 Act….”). As with the short selling regulations discussed earlier, this then illustrates another area in
which small companies traded in the over-the-counter market (i.e., FPS issuers) receive less protection
under the federal securities laws than do large, exchange-traded companies (i.e., companies that would
never consider issuing an FPS).
154
See generally Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120; Log On America Complaint, supra note
121; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123; and JAG Media Holdings
Complaint, supra note 124.
153
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reduced to six months) or otherwise manipulate the price of the company’s stock; (3) that
the purchasers had long-term investment interest in the company and were not purchasing
for resale; (4) that the purchasers had engaged in other FPS deals and created value for
those companies; and (5) that the purchasers were not the subject of lawsuits.156
Nanopierce Technologies alleged a similar cause of action—i.e., that but for
purchasers’ misrepresentations, the company never would have issued its FPS. Unlike
the Internet Law Library complaint, however, Nanopierce based its allegations on the
purchasers’ omissions of material information.157 Specifically, Nanopierce labeled as
material omissions the purchasers’ failure to disclose: (1) their intention to manipulate
Nanopierce stock; (2) their intention to providing the full amount of financing; (3) their
intention to "attempt to take control over Nanopierce"; (4) their "pattern and practice" of
manipulating the stock of other companies; (5) an adverse jury verdict in another FPS
case; and (6) testimony by the purchasers in other court actions that they tend to liquidate
their stock positions in FPS deals.158
b. Market Manipulation Claims
The second set of Section 10(b) claims common to all the death spiral complaints
are allegations that purchasers violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 through “market

155

See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶¶ 29-30; Log On America Complaint, supra note
121, ¶¶ 63-72; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶¶ 58-64; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶¶
107-113; JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶¶ 189-190.
156
See Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt., LLC, et al., 223 F. Supp. 2d 474, 478
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 14.
157
See Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶¶ 32 & 34.
158
See Nanopierce Tech., Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt., LLC, et al., 2002 WL 31819207 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), at 3; see also Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶¶ 32 & 34.

- 32 -

manipulation.”159 Market manipulation is a legal term of art but implies that a defendant
has engaged in a scheme to control or artificially affect the price of a security.160 Here,
FPS issuers allege that their FPS purchasers engaged in such market manipulation by
improperly short selling the issuers’ equity securities, thereby causing the “death spirals.”
The Log On America complaint provides an example of this argument. Log On
America claimed that Promethean et al.caused a classic death spiral for the company —
that, notwithstanding limitations on the amount of short selling allowed under the
Securities Purchase Agreement, the defendants engaged in “massive” short selling to
depress the price of Log On America’s stock.161 This short selling activity therefore
allegedly lays bare the purchasers’ alleged misrepresentations that they had “investment
purposes” in buying the FPS.162 Furthermore, Log On America alleged that the
defendants “painted the tape” (created the illusion of market activity through pre-arranged
trades in the company’s stock), engaged in wash sales (rigged sales), and intentional
naked short selling as part of their effort to deflate the value of Log On America’s
stock.163 The effect of this manipulative scheme, the company claimed, was to enrich the
purchasers at the expense of the company.164
[T]he Defendants have guaranteed themselves completely risk-free profits
and effective control of [Log On America] by structuring and
implementing this scheme …. By having forced the price of [Log On
159

See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶¶ 29-30; Log On America Complaint, supra note
121, ¶¶ 63-72; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶¶ 65-69; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶¶
114-118; JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶¶ 189-190
160
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). Market manipulation is explained in more
detail in Part IV.B. There is a specific section of the securities laws prohibiting market manipulation,
Section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act, however this only applies to securities traded on an exchange and
so is inapplicable to the companies in this study. See supra note 153.
161
Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 32.
162
Id. ¶ 32.
163
Id. ¶ 36.
164
Id. ¶ 38.
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America] common stock from over $17 per share in February 2000 to
$2.50 per shares in August 2000 through their short sales, Defendants not
only assured themselves of millions of dollars in profit (i.e. for every share
shorted at $17 and covered with stock artificially reduced to below $2 per
share, Defendants made $15), but effective control of [Log On America]
and its valuable assets.165
Other of the death spiral complaints examined herein make similar arguments.
For instance, JAG Media Holdings, Internet Law Library, and Sedona all allege similar
market manipulation schemes. First, JAG Media Holdings alleges a wide conspiracy by
purchasers, brokers, and market makers, to manipulate its stock through massive naked
short selling.166 Although by the terms of JAG’s securities purchase agreement the FPS
purchasers were not prevented from short selling,167 JAG alleges that the defendants’
naked short sales created large fails-to-deliver in the market clearing system and that this
amounts to actionable market manipulation.168 This is a unique legal theory as-yet
untested in a court of law.169 Second, Sedona filed suit against twenty-seven named
defendants, including the FPS purchasers and an associated broker-dealer and market
clearing firm,170 whom Sedona alleges all conspired to manipulate Sedona’s stock:171
“Sedona was in a position to be an industry leader when it was preyed upon by the
defendants who orchestrated its downfall.”172 Although JAG cannot point to a clause in
its securities purchase agreement that limits short sales, the reader will recall that the
Internet Law Library and Sedona securities contracts both prohibited FPS purchasers
165

Id. ¶ 37.
See id. ¶ 182.
167
See generally JagNotes.com Securities Purchase Agreement, dated June 12, 2000, and Sec. 2(a),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089029/000088981200002829/0000889812-00002829-0003.txt.
168
See JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶¶ 163 & 169.
169
See infra text accompanying notes 287-98.
170
See id. ¶¶ 2-28, 98, 99.
171
See id. ¶¶ 116-18, 134.
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from short selling.173 These companies thus allege market manipulation through
violations of the short selling restrictions in their securities purchase agreements.174
(Sedona also alleges that investors engaged in unlawful naked short-selling and other
manipulative conduct.)175
The only one of the five issuers discussed herein that did not allege market
manipulation through short selling was Nanopierce Technologies.176 Instead, Nanopierce
argued that its FPS purchaser manipulated its stock through large open-market sales—that
is, that they just sold large amounts of stock in an attempt to depress its price.177 These
sales reportedly accounted for 40% of Nanopierce trading volume over seven months and
allegedly drove the stock’s price from $2.63/share to $0.51/share.178
3. Current Status of These Cases
Out of these five cases, Sedona and JAG Media Holdings are still in the pleadings
stage and have not yet heard motions to dismiss.179 But the other three actions have all
heard motions to dismiss. These motions to dismiss will be examined in Part IV of this
paper, however it suffices at this point to recognize that in all three cases the courts
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See id. ¶ 44.
See supra notes 145-46.
174
See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 19 & 29-30; Sedona Securities Purchase
Agreement Sec. 5.2, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/764843/000095011600001404/0000950116-00-001404-0004.txt
175
See Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶¶ 114-18.
176
See Nanopierce Tech. Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt LLC, Case No. 02-CV-0767, 2002 WL
31819207 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) at n.6 (stating that Nanopierce dropped this claim at oral argument).
Perhaps this was because there were no restrictions on Southridge’s ability to short sell in the securities
purchase agreement. See Nanopierce Purchase Agreement, dated Oct. 20, 2000, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/827161/000092735600001950/0000927356-00-001950-0006.txt.
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See Nanopierce, 2002 WL 31819207 at 8.
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See Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶ 45 & table, p.14-18.
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As of February 18, 2004, the docket reports for Sedona and JAG Media Holdings indicate that no
motions to dismiss have been heard by the courts. See Civil Docket for Case #: 1:03-CV-03120, Sedona
Corp. v. Ladenburg Thalmann, et al., (S.D.N.Y, J. Swain); Civil Docket for Case #: 02-CV-2867, JAG
Media Holdings, et al. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, et al., (S.D.N.Y., J. Gilmore).
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allowed the litigation to move forward and did not reject the issuers’ Section 10(b)
misrepresentation and market manipulation arguments. Log On America was dismissed
without prejudice for being insufficiently pled,180 and then settled by the parties.181
Internet Law Library survived the defendant’s motion to dismiss182 but was eventually
dismissed by the court for discovery violations.183 Nanopierce is thus the only case
among the five to have both heard a motion to dismiss and to remain active in the
courts.184
B) GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt185
Aside from these actions in the Southern District of New York, there is another
case that deserves attention in this paper, GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt. GFL is a
2001 decision in another Future Priced Securities case and is the only action (so far) to
reach a final judgment in a federal court of appeals.186 Furthermore, GFL contains a
lengthy analysis of Section 10(b) market manipulation claims in the context of death
180

See Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt. LLC, et al., 223 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438 & n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that the complaint is dismissed without prejudice for being insufficiently pled but
that the court was in no way ruling upon the ultimate merits of the complaint).
181
See Civil Docket for Case #: 00-CV-06218, Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt. LLC, et
al., (S.D.N.Y., J. Berman), Item # 39: Memo-Endorsement of Settlement Agreement, filed Feb. 6, 2002.
The author has come across two other FPS actions that have also settled. The other two cases are Ariad
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Promethean, et al., 99-CV-10794 (S.D.N.Y., J. Wood) (see Ariad Pharmaceuticals
Jan. 14, 2000 8-K, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/884731/0000950135-00-000141index.html), and Intelect Communications v. HFTP Investments, et al., 99-CV-04338 (S.D.N.Y., J. Chin)
(see Intelect June 8, 1999, Form 8-K, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/316672/
0000890566-99-000868-index.html).
182
See generally Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt, LLC, et al., 223 F. Supp. 2d 474
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
183
Internet Law Library’s complaint was ultimately dismissed with prejudice by the district court on July 8,
2003, but not for reasons germane to this paper. The court dismissed the complaint as to all defendants for
“plaintiffs’ repeated and flagrant disregard for the Court’s [discovery] orders.” See Civil Docket for Case
#: 1:01-CV-06600, Internet Law Library Inc. et al. v. Southridge Cap., et al. (S.D.N.Y., J. Carter), Item
#161: Opinion.
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See Nanopierce Tech., Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt. LLC et al., Case No. 02-CV-0767, 2002 WL
31819207 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002); Civil Docket for Case #: 1:02-CV-00767, Nanopierce Tech. Inc. v.
Southridge Cap., et al. (S.D.N.Y., J. Sand).
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272 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2001).
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spiral litigation and, as a decision of a court of appeals, should have precedential value for
the market manipulation claims discussed above.187 But, as will be demonstrated, GFL
poses a potential legal hurdle for FPS issuer/plaintiffs.
1. GFL v. Colkitt – Facts of the Case & Relevance to Death Spiral Litigation
The facts of GFL parallel the facts of death spiral cases discussed in Part I and
Part III.A above,188 but with a one twist. GFL is like our classic case in that it involves a
small issuer (two companies, actually) that suffered after issuing a Future-Priced
Convertible Security. The twist is that, instead of the companies issuing the FPS’s
themselves, the majority shareholder and founder of the two companies created the FPS
as collateral for a personal loan.189 But this difference does not distinguish GFL’s market
manipulation analysis from other FPS litigation because market manipulation is not made
more or less fraudulent based on who issues a security; instead, the focus of a market
manipulation analysis is on the defendant’s conduct with respect to the market.190 Thus,
GFL should have precedential value in resolving market manipulation claims in death
spiral litigation.
The basic facts of GFL v. Colkitt are these: Douglas Colkitt was a doctor and
businessman who founded two medical services companies, EquiMed, Inc. and National
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The author has found no other FPS case that has reached a federal court of appeals.
Of course, GFL is binding precedent only in the Third Circuit, however this paper assumes that it will
have precedential value in the Southern District of New York as well to guide the resolution of the five
death spiral cases discussed in Part III.A above.
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See supra Part I.A, I.B, & III.A.
189
There are procedural differences in GFL as well, but these are irrelevant. Specifically, GFL Advantage
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however, because the court evaluated the issuer/defendant’s counterclaims for non-enforcement of the FPS
the same as it would if the issuer had been a plaintiff suing to void the FPS.
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Medical Financial Services Corp. (“EquiMed” and “National Medical”).191 As the
founder of these two companies, Colkitt was the majority shareholder and owned 73% of
EquiMed stock and 38% of National Medical stock.192 At the time, EquiMed traded on
the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board,193 while National Medical traded on the Nasdaq
National Market.194
In order to pursue other business opportunities Colkitt sought to turn his large
stockholdings in these companies into cash. Eventually, he turned to GFL Advantage
Fund for financing.195 GFL and Colkitt signed two notes, one for $3 million and another
for $10 million, which paid interest and allowed GFL to convert the notes into shares of
EquiMed and National Medical stock at a discount to the market rate.196 Importantly, the
notes did not restrict GFL’s right to short sell EquiMed or National Medical stock.197
Over the next few months, GFL began exercising its conversion rights.198 At the
same time, however, GFL allegedly began short selling the stock of both companies,
leading to significant drops in the value of EquiMed and National Medical stock.199
Watching the value of his companies disappear, Colkitt eventually decided not to honor
GFL’s conversion rights and GFL sued. Colkitt then counterclaimed against GFL asking
the district court to void the FPS contracts on the grounds that GFL had manipulated the
191

See GFL, 272 F.3d at 194.
Id.
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See, e.g., EquiMed, Inc., Press Release dated July 21, 1998, contained within July 28, 1998 8-K Report,
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/892493/0000892493-98-000006.txt (indicating that
EquiMed stock was traded on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board under the symbol “EQMD”).
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Stock [of National Medical] [was] quoted on the Nasdaq National Market under the symbol ‘NMFS’.”).
195
See GFL, 272 F.3d at 194-95.
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See GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, Case No. 4:97-CV-0526, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21747 at 7-9
(M.D. Pa. July 17, 2000).
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price of EquiMed and National Medical stock through its short sales. But the court
rejected this argument, holding that short selling by itself cannot be market manipulation:
“it is not permissible to infer from short sales alone that the party engaging in short sales
is engaged in market manipulation ….”200 The district court therefore dismissed Colkitt’s
counterclaims and, enforcing the FPS, ordered Colkitt to pay $21 million in principal and
accrued interest to GFL.201
2. GFL v. Colkitt – Implications for Death Spiral Litigation
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment.202 The
court held that Colkitt’s claim failed “because he cannot demonstrate that GFL engaged
in any deceptive or manipulative conduct by injecting false inaccurate information into
the marketplace or [by] creating a false impression of supply and demand for the
stock.”203 Citing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Sullivan & Long v. Scattered,204 the
Third Circuit provided the following guidance:
Unfortunately for Colkitt, [] short selling is lawful, and courts have held
that short selling, even in massive volume, is neither deceptive nor
manipulative when carried out in accordance with SEC rules and
regulations. Therefore, to make out a claim of market manipulation,
Colkitt must present evidence that GFL engaged in some other type of
deceptive behavior in conjunction with its short selling that either injected
inaccurate information into the marketplace or created artificial demand
for the securities. Colkitt has offered nothing but evidence that GFL
engaged in lawful short sales of National Medical and EquiMed, which
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GFL, 272 F.3d at 195.
Id. at 195-96.
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See GFL, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21747 at 17.
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Id. at 39.
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GFL’s short selling in order for his claims to survive a motion to dismiss (though this would eventually be
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alone is insufficient to prevail on a claim of market manipulation in
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.205
GFL thus instructs that short selling, without more, is not a “manipulative device”
within the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and therefore short selling by
itself cannot be a basis for a Section 10(b) market manipulation claim.206 But the
case leaves open an important question for death spiral litigants: “What ‘more’ is
required?”
Part IV – Analysis
This paper will now analyze the securities fraud claims raised in death spiral
cases. As indicated in Part II above, there are two main causes of action,
misrepresentation claims and market manipulation claims. This paper begins with an
analysis of misrepresentation claims and groups these claims into three broad categories:
misrepresentative investment intent, violations of promises with respect to short selling,
and misrepresentations about business practices. This paper will show that all three
classes of argument have merit and (assuming relevant facts can be proved) potentially
allow death spiral plaintiff/issuers to recover from defendant/purchasers. Next, this paper
will examine the market manipulation claims, showing that these too are valid. As part of
the analysis, this paper will argue that naked short selling is market manipulation and
therefore that plaintiffs such as JAG Media Holdings who assert this cause of action
assert valid prima face claims. The analysis discusses naked short selling at some length
because this is an as-yet-untested theory in the courts of the United States and, if
established, would be significant to the future of death spiral litigation.

205
206

GFL, 272 F.3d at 211 (citation omitted).
Id. at 211.

- 40 -

A) Misrepresentation In Violation of Section 10(b)207 of the Securities Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5208 Promulgated Thereunder
1.

Standing to Sue, Elements of a Successful Claim, & Facial Validity of the Actions
As a threshold matter, FPS issuer/plaintiffs will have standing to sue the assorted

defendants in death spiral actions (purchasers, brokers, and market makers) under the
federal securities laws. In the context of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 litigation, courts
have upheld the broad applicability of these anti-fraud provisions to many types of
securities actions. For instance, as early as 1971 the Supreme Court stated that Section
10(b) “protects corporations as well as individuals who are sellers of a security.”209
Furthermore, Section 10(b) allows for lawsuits based on private placements (i.e., it is not
restricted to sales in the secondary markets)210 and there is no limitation within these antifraud provisions on the types of defendants that may be sued. Instead, Section 10(b) is a
broad “catch-all” anti-fraud provision.211 Thus, the question for FPS issuers in death
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Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered … any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (2004).
208
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spiral litigation is simply whether the elements of the cause of action will be met as
against each defendant.
To state a cause of action for misrepresentation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5, a plaintiff must demonstrate five things:212 (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact or
an omission of a material fact necessary to make information not misleading; (2) in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security by the plaintiff; (3) made by the
defendant, acting with scienter; (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied; and (5) that
caused the plaintiff to suffer damages.213 Based on these elements, FPS issuers have
potentially successful claims for Section 10(b) misrepresentation against FPS purchasers.
The reason for this is that all these elements may be potentially pled and proved at trial:
stated broadly, if an FPS issuer can show that an FPS purchaser intentionally or recklessly
deceived the issuer into selling the FPS and that the issuer suffered damages as a result,
the issuer will be able to recover from the purchaser under Section 10(b).
But to say that these claims have facial validity does not provide much insight into
death spiral lawsuits. This paper thus focuses its analysis on the central legal question in
these claims, materiality. Materiality is the most important factor in the analysis of death
spiral misrepresentation claims because materiality is a question of law214 whereas the
other elements (reliance, scienter, “in connection with,” purchaser/seller, damages) are
questions of fact—i.e., if can the FPS issuer show that it directly relied on specific

212

This is a basic introduction into a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cause of action, however some
familiarity with these provisions is assumed on the part of the reader.
213
See, e.g., Halperin v. eBanker USA.com, Inc., 295 F.3d 352, 356-57 (2d Cir. 2002); Newton v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 2001).
214
See, e.g., Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that materiality is a
mixed question of law and fact). This paper of course assumes away evidentiary issues and practical
problems of proof at trial. Instead, this paper accepts as true the facts alleged in death spiral complaints
(see Part III) and attempts to determine whether these complaints have merit.
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misstatements by the defendants in connection with offering of its FPS to the defendant
and that, in so relying, it suffered damages, the issuer can recover. But materiality is a
legal question that focuses attention on whether, even assuming the misrepresentations
were actually made, they are something that the law and the courts should care about.
Such is the focus of this paper.215
The test for materiality is provided by Supreme Court precedent. Specifically,
two Supreme Court cases, TSC Industries v. Northway216 and Basic Inc. v. Levinson,217
provide guidance on how to evaluate the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation.
These cases instruct that a misrepresentation is material if, based on the total mix of
information, there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the
information significant in deciding how to act.218 This test will now be applied to the
misrepresentations alleged in the five death spiral cases discussed in Part III.A above.
2.

Evaluating Death Spiral Misrepresentation Claims
The misrepresentation claims raised by the five death spiral actions from the

Southern District of New York studied in this paper can be broadly categorized into three
groups: misrepresentations as to investment intent, misrepresentations as to short selling
intentions, and misrepresentations as to prior business practices.219 The Log On America
litigation provides a useful starting point for analyzing these arguments because this case

215

The elements of a Section 10(b) cause of action often blend into one another. In particular, the concept
of materiality and reliance are interconnected. With this in mind, this paper focuses its analysis of death
spiral misrepresentation claims on questions of materiality, discussing the other Section 10(b) elements as
necessary.
216
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
217
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
218
See id. at 231-32.
219
See generally Log On America Complaint, supra note 121; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note
120; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123; JAG Media Holdings
Complaint, supra note 124.
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raises all three issues.220 First, Log On America alleged that the purchasers of its
convertible security misrepresented in the securities purchase agreement that they were
investing in the FPS to acquire stock “for investment only and not with a view toward, or
for resale in connection with, the public sale or distribution thereof.”221 Instead, the
company asserts, the defendants had no such “investment intent” at all but planned from
the outset to manipulate the price of LOA stock downward and profit from its fall.222
Second, Log On America alleges that the defendants misrepresented their intentions with
respect to short selling in that they promised to make only limited short sales223 knowing
that this was false.224 Third, the company asserts that purchasers made a material
omission when they failed to disclose “lawsuits asserted against them by similarly
situated issuers” in other FPS contexts.225
The district court evaluated Log On America’s argument and dismissed it as
insufficiently pled.226 First, with respect to the investment intent issue, the court ruled
that Log On America did not specify how the defendants’ investment representations
gave rise to actionable misconduct227 because language in the securities purchase
agreement effectively nullified Log On America’s averments.228 Second, the court held
that since the securities purchase agreement had allowed short sales (with restrictions)
and Log On America failed to demonstrate any violations of these rules, the company
failed to allege actionable misrepresentations as to the defendants’ short selling
intentions.229 Third, the court was silent on the issue of whether the defendants had a
220

See supra note 121.
See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 30.
222
See id. ¶ 68.
223
See id. ¶ 31.
224
See id. ¶¶ 32 & 34.
221

- 44 -

duty to disclose to the company that other lawsuits had been filed against them in
connection with similar FPS offerings.230 This paper will now evaluate these three legal
issues in detail.
a. Can Deceptive Statements as to “Investment Intent” Be a Section 10(b)
Misrepresentation?
The first claim raised in Log On America is a charge that the defendants violated
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act by misrepresenting their “investment intent”—i.e.,
that the FPS purchasers committed fraud in deceiving LOA about their intentions with
respect to their investment in Log On America’s Future Priced Security. This is a
common claim by FPS issuer/plaintiffs (of the six cases identified in this paper, three
complaints raise such allegations)231 and this paper now reviews the merits of this
argument.
Future Priced Securities are volatile instruments, and companies that issue them
often fail. A wise issuer will therefore want to divine the FPS purchaser’s investment
intentions and to determine, if possible, whether the purchaser might attempt to abuse the
225

See id. ¶ 66.
See Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt., et al., 223 F. Supp. 2d 435, 452 & 438 n.2
(2001) (noting that the court was not ruling on the merits of Log On America’s causes of action, just the
sufficiency of its pleadings).
227
Id. at 444. The author identified three separate misrepresentation allegations in Log On America’s
complaint, however the district court evaluated its claims under only two headings: short selling and
investment intent. See id. at 442-45.
228
Id. at 443 (showing that the Securities Purchase Agreement stated: “Buyer does not agree to hold any of
the securities for any minimum or other specific term.”).
229
See id.
230
The court makes no mention of this issue in its Decision and Order, and only refers to Log On America’s
alleged material omissions briefly. See id. at 443 n.2. It is the author’s opinion that the court overlooked
this issue because it was not sufficiently identified as a separate claim for misrepresentation in the
complaint. Instead, the court evaluated all allegations of material misrepresentations and omissions
together.
231
The three are Log On America, Internet Law Library, and Sedona. Nanopierce alleges related
misrepresentations, but not “investment intent” directly. See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121,
¶ 32; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 14; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 54. See
226
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FPS by using it as the basis for short sales. To protect against this risk issuers ask for
confirmation of the purchasers’ intentions during negotiations over the FPS and by the
terms of the securities purchase agreement. Log On America, for instance, asked the
purchasers of its FPS to profess their investment intent both during contract negotiations
and in writing.232 Nevertheless, it is important to verify that these are material issues
within the meaning of the securities laws that, if misrepresented, can form the basis for a
Section 10(b) cause of action.
It appears clear that these claims are material. Recalling the basic standard for
materiality (information that a reasonable person would consider important in deciding
how to act),233 investment intent with respect to an FPS offering is highly relevant
because the issuer will want to know whether the purchaser is likely to cause a death
spiral subsequent to investing in the FPS. (Looked at another way, no company would
issue an FPS to an investor who baldly stated that it was only interested in using the FPS
as the basis for large short selling of the issuer’s stock.) Th is conclusion is supported by
caselaw. First, of the three complaints studied in this paper that argued investment
intent,234 two proceeded through motions to dismiss and in neither case did the court
throw-out these claims as being immaterial (which the courts could have done).235

also Nanopierce Tech. Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. 02-CV-0767, 2002 WL 31819207 at 3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002).
232
See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 32.
233
See supra text accompanying notes 216-18.
234
See supra note 231.
235
See Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC, 223 F. Supp. 2d 474, 480-86
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that Internet Law Library’s misrepresentation claims sufficiently plead a cause of
action so as to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss); Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt.,
LLC, 223 F. Supp. 2d 435, 443-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing Log On America’s investment intent
argument because other clauses in the securities purchase agreement negated this claim by allowing
Promethean to dispose of assets at any time). Given that Internet Law Library survived the motion to
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Second, this conclusion is supported by relevant securities law precedents such as the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l Holdings, Ltd.236
Wharf involved a misrepresentation claim in which the purchaser of a security sued the
seller alleging that the seller violated Section 10(b) when it sold the security while
secretly never intending to honor the terms of the agreement.237 The Supreme Court
upheld the claim and allowed recovery against the seller, finding that the secret intention
to violate the terms of the securities purchase agreement was a material misrepresentation
in connection with the sale of a security.238
To say that misstatements about investment intent can be a material
misrepresentation with the meaning of Section 10(b) does not complete the analysis,
however. Since these allegations include both oral and written misstatements in the
context of negotiating and executing securities purchase agreements, there are important
contract law principles that will determine whether the misstatements should even be
considered part of the securities contract. First, there is a question of definiteness. Courts
will need to evaluate exactly what statements the defendants are alleged to have made to
determine if these statements are sufficiently definite so as to proscribe particular
conduct.239 Second, the parol evidence rule may potentially bar recovery for strictly oral
misrepresentations where there was a contrary written agreement.

dismiss, this demonstrates the merit of the investment intent argument, because if this allegation had been
immaterial the court properly should have dismissed it at that stage of the trial.
236
532 U.S. 588 (2001).
237
See id. at 590.
238
See id. at 596-97.
239
See 166 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v. 151 East Post Road Corp., 575 N.E.2d 104, 105 (N.Y. 1991) (“The
doctrine of definiteness or certainty is well established in contract law. In short, it means that a court cannot
enforce a contract unless it is able to determine what in fact the parties have agreed to.”).
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Under general contract-law parol evidence principles, where a written agreement
differs from oral statements of a party during negotiations, the written agreement will
control. This is especially true when there is a merger clause in the contract stating that
the writing is the entire agreement of the parties.240 In the context of securities fraud
actions under Section 10(b), however, courts may choose not to apply the parol evidence
rule quite so rigorously. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, has doubted
the correctness of applying parol evidence principles in the context of securities fraud
cases because this could shield fraudulent oral misrepresentations, defeating the basic
purpose of Section 10(b).241 Other courts, however, retain a stricter adherence to the
parol evidence rule, even in the context of securities offerings.242
It therefore appears that claims of deceptive “investment intent” in death spiral
litigation can reasonably be decided for or against FPS issuers, depending upon the facts
and circumstances in each case and the willingness or unwillingness of a court to adhere
to principles such as the parol evidence rule. In terms of the cases studied in this paper,
this renders support to Sedona Corp.’s allegations that the purchasers of its FPS violated
Section 10(b) when they made oral misrepresentations of being “long-term investors”
only interested in the “best long-term interest of Sedona”243 while the text of its securities
purchase agreement reinforced this notion.244 These oral and written misrepresentations

240

See, e.g., Global Intellicom v. Thomson Kernaghan & Co., 1999 WL 544708, at 11 (July 27, 1999)
(holding that claims of oral misrepresentations in connection with a securities offering were not actionable
where the securities offering contained contrary language and a merger clause).
241
E.g. Caiola v. Citibank, 295 F.3d 312, 330 n.9 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that the importation of parol
evidence principles into the context of securities fraud cases is “questionable” because this acts to defeat the
purposes of the antifraud provisions).
242
See id. (discussing alternate court decisions on point); see also supra note 239.
243
See Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 43.
244
See Sedona Securities Purchase Agreement Sec. 3.1, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/3959/000093066100003254/0000930661-00-003254-0003.txt.
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taken together appear to be material and therefore justify recovery against the defendants
(provided that Sedona can to establish the definiteness of these misrepresentations).245
b. Is an Intentional Violation of a Promise or Restriction on Short-Selling a
Section 10(b) Misrepresentation?
The preceding discussion shows that it is difficult to predict the outcome of
misrepresentation claims over statements of “investment intent,” in part because of
questions of definiteness. In contrast, violations of more definite contract terms, such as
prohibitions against short selling, have a more predictable outcome. A number of death
spiral complaints allege Section 10(b) misrepresentation in that purchasers (and
occasionally brokers and market makers as well) misrepresented to the issuers that they
would not sell the issuers’ stock short and then did exactly that.246 These claims should
be actionable as 10(b) misrepresentation where the issuer can show an intentional
violation of a contracted-for short-selling restriction in a securities purchase agreement.
Claims based on oral misrepresentations may be valid as well.
An intentional violation of a substantive clause in a securities purchase agreement
will be actionable under Section 10(b) where the clause was material to the agreement.
Making a specific promise to perform a particular act in the future while
secretly intending not to perform that act may violate Section 10(b) where
the promise is part of the consideration for the transfer of securities. Such
a promise, however, must encompass particular actions and be more than a
generalized promise to act as a faithful fiduciary.247
245

Cf. One-On-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that an integration
clause in securities contract nullified prior oral misrepresentations about the “long-term” investment horizon
of purchaser rendering the oral misrepresentations not actionable).
246
Log On America, Internet Law Library, and Sedona alleged this directly. See Log On America
Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 31; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶¶ 14 & 17; and Sedona
Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 68. Nanopierce evidently alleged this and then dropped it at trial. See
Nanopierce Complaint ¶ 32; 2002 WL 31819207 at 4 n.6.
247
Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted) reaffirmed in Mills v. Polar
Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1176 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The failure to carry out a promise made in
connection with a securities transaction is normally a breach of contract. It does not constitute fraud unless,
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Short selling restrictions are such material promises. Issuers demand these restrictions in
order to prevent death spirals and this is an issue that a reasonable issuer would consider
significant in deciding whether to issue the security.248 Thus, where a purchaser and
issuer sign a securities purchase agreement that prohibits or restricts short sales by the
purchaser and the purchaser then violates those contract terms, a Section 10(b) cause of
action will arise.
But to show actionable securities fraud in this context, the issuer will have to
demonstrate that the purchaser intended to break this provision at the time the offering
was made. Simply showing that a purchaser violated short selling restrictions in a
securities purchase agreement is not enough; that would be breach of contract, but not
securities fraud.249 Instead, the plaintiff must show that the defendant never intended to
abide by the short selling restrictions. This is necessary because of the “in connection
with a purchase or sale of securities” requirement under Section 10(b)—that is, if the
issuer cannot show that the purchaser made a material misrepresentation about its
intentions to abide by short selling restrictions in a securities purchase agreement, there
will be no securities fraud because the misrepresentation did not occur in connection with
the sale.250

when the promise was made, the defendant secretly intended not to perform or knew that he could not
perform.”).
248
See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
249
See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing and
demonstrating that not every breach of a securities contract is a securities fraud).
250
See supra notes 212-13 and accompany text. This discussion demonstrates how these Sec. 10(b)
concepts are interrelated. Also, because of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, plaintiffs
also must plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of defendants’ scienter. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2004); Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003).
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The analysis for strictly oral misrepresentations is different, however, and
proceeds under the framework laid out in subparagraph (a) above. As indicated in that
discussion, FPS issuers will have a cause of action if a court decides to admit parol
evidence associated with the securities offering.251 Turning to the cases in this paper, the
Internet Law Library252 litigation provides an example of these principles at work. In
Internet Law Library, the court rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that
the company’s misrepresentation claim was actionable when it was based on
misstatements about short selling intentions.253 Although the facts of Internet Law
Library indicate that there were short selling restrictions in its securities purchase
agreement, the text of the decision indicates that the court was unconcerned with whether
the short-selling promises were oral or written.254 The court, finding this to be a material
misrepresentation, adopted a liberal interpretation of the parol evidence rule and allowed
the claim.
c. Is Failing to Disclose Prior FPS Deals a Section 10(b) Misrepresentation?
A final common complaint of FPS issuers is that purchasers have misrepresented
their prior business practices. Specifically, issuers allege that purchasers misrepresented
themselves as not having engaged in prior FPS offerings or not having caused “death
spirals” before when, in fact, the purchasers had done so repeatedly.255 These alleged
misrepresentations and omissions occurred in the context of negotiations over the FPS
offering and are a form of fraud in the inducement: the issuers allege that the purchasers
251

See supra text accompanying notes 240-42.
See supra Part III.A.
253
See Internet Law Library v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., et al., 223 F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
254
See id. at 478-80 & 482.
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violated Sec. 10(b) by misrepresenting themselves and that the issuers never would have
issued the FPS’s if they had known the background of their ‘investors.’ These claims
should be actionable because in a private placement such as an FPS, this information will
be material.
In making these claims, FPS issuers must consider two important points. First,
the issuers must show that the purchasers lied or omitted information in response to an
inquiry from the issuer. The reason for this is that FPS purchasers do not have a duty of
disclosure. Courts do not recognize a generalized duty to disclose all material
information in the context of negotiating a securities agreement, yet any
misrepresentation claim must be rooted in a misstatement or an omission coupled with a
duty.256 Second, the misstatement or omission must not be contradicted by other
information available to the issuer, such as through disclosures in the securities offering
documents. “Over and again we say that people claiming to be victims of securities fraud
may not claim to rely on oral statements inconsistent with written documents (even
tedious prospectuses) available to them.”257 If the information that the issuer complains
of is contained in writings that were available to the issue, the issuer will be considered to
have had constructive notice of these facts and so will have no basis for recovery due to
contrary oral misstatements.

255

See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 56; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120,
¶ 14; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶ 34; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 50.
256
E.g., McCormick v. Fund American Co. Inc., 26 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1994).
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B) Market Manipulation In Violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
1.

Elements In A Successful Claim
The second broad category of securities fraud claims raised in the death spiral

lawsuits studied in this paper are market manipulation claims. The text of Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits the use of any “manipulative or deceptive
device” in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,258 and market manipulation
claims thus derive from this language. Manipulation in this context is “a term of art” that
“connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by
controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.”259 In particular, the term
“market manipulation” refers to fraudulent practices such as wash sales, matched orders,
or rigged prices that are intended to mislead investors by creating an artificial appearance
of market activity.260
To sustain a Section 10(b) market manipulation in the Southern District of New
York, a plaintiff must allege the following five elements: (1) that the plaintiff suffered
damages; (2) in reliance on the defendant’s material misrepresentations, omissions, or
scheme to defraud; (3) that the defendant acted with scienter; (4) that this occurred in
connection with plaintiff’s purchase or sale of a security; and (5) that this was furthered
by the defendant’s use of the mails or a national securities exchange.261 This test comes
from cases such as Schell v. Conseco, Inc.262 and Global Intellicom v. Thomson

257

S.E.C. v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 1998).
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2004).
259
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
260
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
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E.g, Schnell v. Conseco, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 438, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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Id.
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Kernaghan & Co.263 In contrast, the Third Circuit examines market manipulation claims
a bit differently. GFL Advantage Fund v. Colkitt 264 explains that the elements of a
private plaintiff’s market-manipulation claim are: (1) the defendant engaged in deceptive
or manipulative conduct by injecting inaccurate information into the marketplace or by
creating a false impression of supply and demand for a security; (2) in connection with
plaintiff’s purchase or sale of the security; (3) that the defendant had the purpose of
artificially depressing or inflating the price of the security [i.e., acted with scienter]; and
(4) that the plaintiff suffered damages (5) in reliance on the defendant’s conduct.265 This
paper will evaluate FPS market manipulation claims primarily using the GFL standard,
because it is the superior test.266 Nevertheless, this paper will turn to the Schnell/Global
Intellicom approach for comparison given that most FPS actions will be decided in the
Southern District of New York (and so will apply the Schnell/Global Intellicom
language).267 In the end, though, these two tests should yield similar results when applied
to the same set of facts so it ultimately should not matter which test a court applies.
2.

Evaluating Death-Spiral Complaints

263

No. 99-CV-0342, 1999 WL 544708 at 7 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1999).
272 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2001).
265
See id. at 206-11.
266
The two tests list the same basic elements, they just express them differently. For instance, the GFL-test
examines materiality in greater depth (due to the Third Circuit’s lengthy examination of short-selling law in
its opinion) but ignores Sec. 10(b)’s link to the use of the mails, a national securities exchange, or interstate
commerce (because, under modern conceptions of these terms, this statutory hook will always be met in
securities cases and so this is a non-issue). The reason GFL is superior is that the Third Circuit came up
with this test after a lengthy investigation of the law related to 10(b) market manipulation claims and after
specific application of the law to an FPS issuer’s short-selling claims. See supra Part III.B discussing GFL
v. Colkitt. In contrast, the Schnell/ Global Intellicom approach is not so tailored. Compare GFL, 272 F.3d
at 203-12, with Schnell, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 448 and Global Intellicom, 1999 WL 544708 at 7.
267
For example, Nanopierce, Internet Law Library, and Log On America all follow the Schnell/Global
Intellicom standard (see 2002 WL 31819207 at 6; 223 F. Supp. 2d at 487; 223 F. Supp. 2d at 445)
notwithstanding the approach taken in GFL. These district courts surely apply Schnell/Global Intellicom
because that is the test applicable in the Second Circuit.
264
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GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt is an appropriate starting point to analyze
market manipulation claims in the context of death spiral litigation because it is a final
judgment from a federal appeals court and is factually similar to this paper’s “classic
case” FPS.268 The reader will recall that in GFL the majority shareholder of two small
companies (Mr. Colkitt) had issued a Future Priced Security as collateral for a loan and
was sued by the purchaser for failing to convert it. Mr. Colkitt argued that the conversion
should be excused because the purchasers had caused a death spiral in the two companies
through massive short selling of their securities.269 But like most FPS’s,270 Mr. Colkitt
had imposed no short selling restrictions, and so the court enforced the FPS.271 Thus,
GFL, like Nanopierce272 and JAG Media Holdings273 (and this paper’s “classic case”
Future Priced Security)274 involved an FPS offering in which there were no short selling
restrictions in the FPS purchase agreement. (The reader is reminded that Sedona275 and
Internet Law Library276 did contain prohibitions on short selling in their securities
purchase agreements while Log On America277 prohibited naked short selling.)
To begin, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Colkitt’s market
manipulation claim because the court determined that he failed to demonstrate that the
purchaser, GFL Advantage Fund, had engaged in any deceptive or manipulative

268

See supra Part III.B. and text accompanying notes 18-25.
See supra text accompanying notes 191-201.
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See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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conduct.278 The court thus focused its attention on the first element in its five-part test
(see above).279 With respect to “injecting inaccurate information into the marketplace,”
the court dismissed Colkitt’s argument that short sales, by their very nature, “convey to
the market participants negative information about the prospects of the firm.”280
Although the court recognized that short sales convey a negative opinion of a stock by the
short seller, the court reasoned that they do not distort the market or otherwise inject false
information because there is nothing inherently improper about short selling.281
The Third Circuit also provided guidance on the issue of “creating a false
impression of supply and demand for a security” under its test.282 Accepting the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals’ rationale of Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered, Corp.,283 the
Third Circuit reasoned that short selling—even massive short selling—does not create a
false impression of supply and demand in the market because there are other parties
betting against these transactions.284 “[S]hort selling, even in large volumes, is not in and
of itself unlawful and therefore cannot be regarded as evidence of market
manipulation.”285 The court concluded that to show market manipulation through short
selling a plaintiff would have to show some manipulative factor in addition to the short
selling; short selling by itself is simply not enough.286
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See GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 207 (3d Cir. 2001).
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Id. at 209.
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a. What Does GFL v. Colkitt Instruct About Naked Short Selling Claims?
This therefore begs the question of what would have been sufficient to find
actionable market manipulation; what ‘else’ is required? In particular, one of the
interesting claims raised in death spiral lawsuits is that defendants have engaged in naked
short selling in order to depress the issuer’s stock price and that this should be deemed
market manipulation. Of the five death spiral complaints analyzed in this paper, Sedona
and JAG Media Holdings both allege that the defendants engaged in naked short selling
and that this should be viewed as manipulative.287 What is the likely outcome of these
claims?
It is unclear based solely on GFL whether a court would find naked short selling
to be market manipulation, but this paper argues that it should be so declared. There are
no court decisions that explicitly support this conclusion288 (although the SEC considers
naked short selling to be a potentially manipulative practice289 as do some
commentators)290 while, contrarily, there is precedent suggesting that naked short selling
is not manipulative.291
For example, a court following GFL could reason that the intent to cause fails-todeliver by naked short selling inflates beneficial ownership of a security292 and therefore
creates a “false impression of supply and demand” for the security in violation of the GFL
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market manipulation test.293 A court could also conclude that intentional naked short
sales violate market rules (such as brokers’ delivery requirements)294 and therefore “inject
false information into the marketplace,” similarly violating the GFL test.295 These are
potential ways in which naked short selling could be deemed market manipulation. The
GFL decision lists some practices that courts have held to be market manipulation in
other cases, including trading through false accounts, engaging in sham transactions or
unreported transactions, and making secret agreements or matched orders.296
Conspicuously absent from this list is naked short selling (because no court has yet held
that naked short selling is a manipulative practice). But naked short selling, like the list
of practices enumerated in GFL as market manipulations, is a violation of market rules
and equitable trading principles.297 In fact, the notion that naked short selling is
manipulative because it violates equitable trading practices underlies the SEC’s
assessment of this issue.298 Thus, naked short selling is clearly in the same league as
other practices that have previously been declared to be market manipulations. It should
be so found.
The problem with this interpretation and application of GFL, though, is that it
runs headlong into Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered, Corp.299 Sullivan & Long is one of
the few cases to deal with the issue of naked short selling and was cited approvingly in
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GFL.300 Sullivan & Long holds that naked short selling is not in and of itself
manipulative under Section 10(b),301 and so this case is problematic for the position
advocated herein and argued by death spiral plaintiffs. If a court is ever to declare that
naked short selling is market manipulation, it will need to distinguish or discredit the
result in Sullivan & Long. This can be done.
Naked short selling should be declared to be a manipulative device in violation of
Section 10(b) (i.e., naked short selling should suffice as that ‘something more’ required
under GFL)302 where the naked short seller violates a market rule or equitable trading
principle. Sullivan & Long can then be distinguished on this point. Sullivan & Long
involved a lawsuit brought by a securities purchaser against a market maker of LTV Steel
Corp for alleged market manipulation of LTV stock.303 The plaintiff, Sullivan & Long,
Inc., claimed that the market maker (Scattered Corp.) engaged in massive uncovered short
selling of LTV stock304 and that this depressed the value of LTV stock, causing Sullivan
& Long to lose money.305 In this way, Sullivan & Long alleged that Scattered caused a
sort of death spiral (although Scattered of course had no Future Priced Security through
which to cover its short sales).
What Sullivan & Long failed to recognize, however, was that Scattered had an
edge: superior information. At the time, LTV was emerging from a bankruptcy
reorganization and Scattered knew (because it had read the bankruptcy reorganization
plan) that LTV stock would soon be hugely devalued once the reorganization was
300
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approved.306 (This information was not secret or proprietary, Scattered was just paying
closer attention than other market participants.) Thus, Scattered thus took advantage of
this information by short selling LTV stock until it approached the inevitable postreorganization value.307
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found no problem with Scattered’s
activities because what it was doing was arbitraging the security toward its true value.
“The name for what Scattered did is not market manipulation, but arbitrage.”308 But an
important factor in this result was that Scattered had not violated any rules of the
securities exchange in conducting its naked short sales.309 At the time, the Chicago
Stock Exchange (where LTV stock was trading) had no rules preventing naked short
selling and Scattered’s naked short sales thus did not violate any market rules. This is a
sufficient legal reason to distinguish the holding of Sullivan & Long from the principles
advocated herein.
What is more, there are a number of practical reasons to distinguish Sullivan &
Long from the rule advocated above with respect to death spiral litigation. First, Sullivan
& Long involved naked short selling in the market for an exchange-traded security of a
large company. LTV stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange310 and so was
subject to the full panoply of SEC and exchange-related short-selling regulations,
including Rule 10a-1’s “tick test.”311 Moreover, LTV was a large industrial company
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with assets of $6 billion,312 a liquid market for its stock, and extensive coverage on Wall
Street and in the financial press. In short, it was appropriate for the Seventh Circuit to
decide Sullivan & Long from the perspective of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
(“ECMH”) and trust that the market was ‘finding’ the correct value for the stock when
Scattered was making uncovered short sales.313 None of these conditions apply in the
context of Future Priced Securities cases, however.
The result in Sullivan & Long should be distinguished from death spiral cases
because FPS issuers are universally small, financially weak companies, trading in
inefficient, illiquid markets that lack regulatory protections such as short-sale pricing
rules. Thus, the ECMH does not apply to instruct that the market, if left alone, can be
trusted to ‘correctly’ price the value of FPS issuers’ securities. Instead, it is much easier
for one market participant to move the price of the stock. It therefore would be
inappropriate to allow naked short selling of these securities because there simply will not
be sufficient market interest in these companies to maintain the value of their securities in
the face of a determined naked short seller. This is borne-out by the fact that FPS issuers
almost universally suffer stock declines after issuing their securities314 and the reasonable
inference thatthe massive short- selling by FPS purchasers is a cause of this.
A second practical reason to set Sullivan & Long aside from death spiral cases is
that the defendant in Sullivan & Long had virtually perfect pricing information. Scattered
312

See, e.g., LTV Corp. Files for Protection from Creditors Under Chapter 11, supra note 299.
The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis as generally proposed states that the price of a stock trading in
an efficient market will reflect all publicly available information about the company. Some of the measures
of an efficient market for a stock are taken as: large trading volume in the stock (liquidity), a significant
number of reviewing analysts, the existence of market makers and arbitrageurs, eligibility to register
securities on Form S-3, and historical responsiveness of the stock’s price to market news. For a discussion
of the ECMH, see Robert G. Newkirk, Sufficient Efficiency: Fraud on the Market in the Initial Public
Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1393 (1991).

313

- 61 -

Inc. had been paying close attention to LTV’s bankruptcy filings and knew with virtual
certainty that, after the reorganization, the company’s stock would become worth only 3
or 4 cents (a significant drop from the previous market price).315 Scattered therefore
could short sell with virtually no risk and it was reasonable, ex post, for a court to view
this conduct as efficient and productive: there was an objectively calculable ‘correct’
market value for LTV stock. But perfect pricing information will rarely exist. And for
small companies like FPS issuers that have variable income streams and uncertain
business plans, it is highly unlikely that anyone will be able to price the stock as
accurately as Scattered priced LTV. Thus, naked short selling of an FPS issuer’s stock is
much more likely to mark the actions of a stock manipulator than it is to be a sign of a
well-informed arbitrageur.
b. Should GFL Be Relied Upon?
The preceding discussion has argued that naked short selling should be declared to
be a manipulative practice in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 where it violates
market rules and that this result is consistent with caselaw and securities law principles.
This is a potentially important legal result in that it would for the first time answer a basic
question about the practice of naked short selling. To reach this conclusion, this paper
has relied heavily on the reasoning in GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, but has not
yet examined the basic correctness of that decision. This paper now examines that
foundational issue.
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As previously indicated, GFL stands for the proposition that short selling, without
more, is not actionable 10(b) market manipulation.316 The Third Circuit in GFL engaged
in a lengthy examination of caselaw to reach this conclusion,317 and the court’s legal
analysis will not be retold.318 The correctness of the decision instead can be demonstrated
by positing potential alternate holdings and demonstrating that none of these alternatives
would have been sound.
First, the court had to reject Mr. Colkitt’s argument that short selling alone could
amount to market manipulation because this would have undermined the securities
markets. Short selling is permitted under the federal securities laws because it has market
benefits319 and to have declared that it can be manipulative within the meaning of Section
10(b) would potentially criminalize an entire market-wide practice. The court was in no
position to do that. Thus, it had to draw lines around permissible and impermissible short
selling. This is exactly what its holding does.320 Second (and more realistically), the
court potentially could have accepted some of Colkitt’s narrower arguments. For
instance, Colkitt argued that the large volume of GFL short sales amounted to market
manipulation and that the court should could adopt a rule separating legal from illegal
short selling by examining a rule with volume restrictions.321 But rejecting this argument
was also proper because this would have involved the court in hopeless line-drawing:

316

See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
See GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 202-12 (3d Cir. 2001).
318
This paper has discussed GFL at length and it is not the purpose to simply be a casenote on the validity
of the decision. However, this paper concludes that the Third Circuit’s legal analysis was correct.
319
See supra note 44-47 and accompanying text.
320
The court of course might have accepted some of Colkitt’s narrower arguments, such as that GFL’s use
of multiple brokers was evidence of concealment, but those are line-drawing questions that also support the
fundamental holding that short selling by itself is not market manipulation. See GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd.
v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).
321
See id. at 209.
317

- 63 -

how much short selling is ‘too much’ so as to become manipulative (and how would a
court of law even answer this question)? There is only one flaw in GFL’s analysis, but it
does not undermine the decision or discredit the court’s holding.322
c. What Does This Analysis Imply About Market Manipulation Claims that
Allege Violations of a Securities Purchase Agreement?
Based on this discussion, it is apparent that death spiral plaintiff/issuers who argue
that a defendant engaged in market manipulation solely by short selling the issuer’s stock
will not have cognizable claims. Instead, plaintiffs must allege that a defendant also
engaged in a manipulative practice, such as naked short selling or one of the practices
enumerated in GFL.323 But what about violating the terms of a securities purchase
agreement—is that enough? This section takes up this question.
A final issue raised in this analysis is whether short selling can be market
manipulation where it is done in violation of a securities purchase agreement. In terms of
the death spiral complaints reviewed in Part III of this paper, three companies made such
allegations. (Internet Law Library and Sedona argued market manipulation when
defendants allegedly violated prohibitions on short selling contained in their securities
purchase agreements,324 while Log On America alleged that the purchasers of its FPS
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violated short-selling volume restrictions.)325 Assuming that the plaintiffs’ allegations are
true, these claims would certainly amount to breach of contract. But the question of
securities fraud is more complex; breach of a securities contract does not per se imply
securities fraud.326 Returning to the GFL and Schnell/Global Intellicom market
manipulation tests, the question would be whether violating the terms of a securities
contract with respect to short selling amounts to (under GFL) “deceptive or manipulative
conduct [that] inject[s] inaccurate information into the marketplace or [creates] a false
impression of supply or demand,” or is (under Schnell) a “material misrepresentation,
omission, or scheme to defraud.”327 Based on the language of these two tests, it appears
that these analyses could generate contrary results, though they ought not do so.
Under GFL, these arguments would likely fail. By the language of the GFL
market manipulation test, it is difficult to see how violating the terms of a securities
purchase agreement “injects inaccurate information into the marketplace” or “creates a
false impression of supply and demand for a security” because the terms of a bilateral
securities contract have no bearing on the market for the security. (In fact, if the terms of
the contract were not public, the market would not even be aware of the violation at all.)
GFL emphasizes the point that the court is looking for an effect on the market and so
implies that a breach of a securities contract will not amount to market manipulation.328
In contrast, the language of the Schnell/Global Intellicom test is more favorable to these
arguments because that test only looks broadly for a material “scheme to defraud.” A
325
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court might accept an FPS issuer’s argument that, for instance, a defendant engaged in
market manipulation when it promised not to engage in short selling activity and then
broke this promise because it was an integral part of a scheme to defraud. These two tests
therefore facially support different results, however they ought not produce different
outcomes if applied correctly.
These two tests ought to lead to the same result: that these claims are not
actionable. This conclusion follows from understanding why the GFL test is superior to
the Schnell/Global Intellicom test. To begin, the Schnell/Global Intellicom test was
drawn from prior market manipulation caselaw in the Southern District of New York
without revision.329 The courts thus took a general test and applied it to whatever market
manipulation claims were raised by the plaintiffs. Yet the lack of refinement of this
general test to the specific context of short selling is a major oversight, because short
selling is acknowledged as a legitimate market activity. To say that short selling by itself
can be part of a ‘scheme to defraud’ runs contrary to the essential validity of the practice.
What is more, the Schnell/Global Intellicom test ignores important market manipulation
precedents cited in GFL including Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,330 Gurary v. Winehouse,331
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and In re Olympia Brewing Co. Securities Litigation.332 These decisions would have to
be squared with any holding that short selling in violation of a securities purchase
agreement is market manipulation, but this will be difficult to do. For, as the GFL court
identifies, these cases also indicate that market manipulation claims must show an effect
on the marketplace.
Part V – Regulatory Issues
This paper has analyzed some of the common securities fraud claims made by
issuers of Future Priced Securities, specifically, misrepresentation and market
manipulation in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. As
indicated in Part III, these claims generally have merit and it therefore appears clear that
death spiral litigation has a future in the district courts of the United States. But there are
also important regulatory issues arising out of concerns over Future Priced Securities that
have not yet been discussed. The problems caused by Future Priced Securities imply a
need for some sort of regulatory response as FPS issuers appear to be routinely abused by
the purchasers of these instruments. This is a problem both for the issuers of these
companies and for innocent shareholders who are victimized by the devaluation of their
investments.333 But what is to be done?
Future Priced Securities could simply be prohibited by state law—i.e., state
corporate laws could be amended to prevent companies chartered there from issuing any
securities that are convertible into a fixed value (as opposed to predetermined numbers)
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of shares. But this appears to be an overly drastic response and would eliminate the
valuable role that FPS’s play in financing. Companies ought to be able to issue securities
that provide investors with confidence that the value of their investment will be protected
irrespective of fluctuations in the issuer’s stock price. For small issuers that have limited
financing choices, Future Priced Securities ought to be an available means of financing to
continue operations. The focus of regulation therefore should be to reduce the potential
for abuse that now exists.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, responding to complaints from issuers
and investors about market abuses by naked short sellers, recently issued for comment
Regulation SHO.334 If adopted as proposed, Regulation SHO will impact Future Priced
Securities by overhauling short selling regulation. There are two major changes proposed
by Regulation SHO. First, Regulation SHO proposes to abandon Rule 10a-1’s “tick test”
in favor of a uniform “bid test” for exchange-traded and Nasdaq National Market
Securities.335 This new bid test would be similar to NASD Rule 3350 and is designed to
satisfy the same three rationales underlying Rule 10a-1.336 This change generally would
not help issuers of Future Priced Securities, however, because the SEC has exempted the
Nasdaq SmallCap, OTCBB, and Pink Sheets markets (where many FPS issuers trade)
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from this rule.337 Thus, many FPS issuers would continue to have no pricing rule to
prevent downward pressure on their securities due to short selling.
Instead, FPS issuers will have to rely on the second major change that would be
effected by Regulation SHO, a uniform “locate” rule and “delivery” rule for brokers.338
The SEC is proposing new Rule 203, “a uniform ‘locate’ rule applicable to all equity
securities, wherever they are traded.”339 This proposed rule would prevent naked short
selling by requiring that brokers locate and annotate in writing prior to a short sale where
securities are to be borrowed from.340 Furthermore, the SEC is proposing a new delivery
rule “targeted at securities where there is evidence of significant settlement failures.”341
This rule would restrict short selling of securities where fails-to-deliver have
accumulated,342 thereby helping prevent the abuses alleged by Future Priced Securities
issuers like JAG Media Holdings.343 These new rules, applicable to all securities
wherever traded, should help prevent death spirals. For instance, the massive naked short
selling alleged by JAG Media Holdings would become illegal. Furthermore, other death
spiral schemes would be made more difficult because the locate-and-deliver rules would
preclude an FPS purchaser from relying on an FPS coming-due months in the future to
337
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cover current short sales. Death spirals would still be possible, but would be made more
difficult to effectuate.
Part VI – Conclusion
This paper has shown that death spiral litigation has a clear future in United States
district courts. Future Priced Securities issuers can sustain valid claims against the
purchasers of these instruments for either misrepresentation or market manipulation in
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. This would appear to be a just
result. The facts and schemes alleged in death spiral complaints strongly suggest that
individuals who short-sell on the basis of an FPS are not arbitraging or trading on
changed circumstances but instead have preconceived plans by which to profit from a
position of power over the company. And since Future Priced Securities have the
potential to be useful financing instruments for small companies, regulators should ensure
that these securities are not tools of abuse. Regulation SHO, if adopted as proposed by
the SEC, would be a substantial step in this direction.
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